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I. INTRODUCTION: DARWINISM AND MARGINALISM
For legal policy the two most important scientific ideas of the nine-
teenth century were Darwinism and marginalism. 1 Both became the
* Ben V. and Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. My thanks to participants
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ern University Law School, the University of Virginia Law School, ITT Chicago-Kent Law School,
and the University of Iowa Legal History Workshop.
1. A third candidate is Freudianism.
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starting points for the great revolutions in the social sciences that took
place in the 1870s and later.2
The central principle of Darwinism is the theory of evolution by
natural selection. Because nature produces many more offspring than
each niche in the environment can accommodate, individuals of a par-
ticular species must compete to survive. Purely at random each individ-
ual acquires from its parents a set of characteristics that are different
from those of any other individual. Those who inherit characteristics
that give them a competitive advantage tend to live long enough to
have offspring of their own. They pass these characteristics on to future
generations, who then continue the struggle.
The starting point for Darwinian analysis of the human individual
is the environment. Both the human organism and its behavior are a
product of the environment, shaped over many generations. The organ-
ism's choices are determined by the situation around it.
By contrast to Darwinism, marginalism begins with the human be-
ing as an autonomous decisionmaker.3 Each individual has a certain
amount of wealth and a collection of wants, but as his desire for some
particular thing is fulfilled, his wish for more of that thing diminishes.
The individual then maximizes his satisfaction by purchasing goods in
such quantities so that, at the margin, the amount of satisfaction each
gives him is precisely the same.4
Marginalism was such an important observation within economic
theory that it formed the principal boundary line between "classicism"
and "neoclassicism"-a boundary that is as significant in its own do-
main as the boundary between pre-Darwinian and post-Darwinian nat-
ural science. The main distinction between the classical political
economists (Adam Smith through John Stuart Mill) and the neoclas-
sicists (mainly William Stanley Jevons and Alfred Marshall) is that the
former were pre-marginalist.
Marginalism and Darwinism are very different, often inconsistent
world views, but they share certain fundamental starting points. For
example, they are both aggressively presentist. In both the struggle for
survival and the maximization of satisfaction, status and past history
mean little when weighed against the situation and the impulses of the
moment. In this sense both Darwinism (at least as it developed in the
social sciences) and marginalism are antihistorical. According to Dar-
winism the same physical or mental attributes that were assets in yes-
2. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 645
(1985); Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge, 1991).
3. See William S. Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy 1-2 (Oxford, 1871).
4. Id. at 51-60.
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terday's struggle might be liabilities in today's, particularly if the
environment has changed in the meantime. For marginalism, incentives
are determined entirely by current wishes or needs and have little to do
with previous commitments or historical status. As a result, both eco-
nomics and the social sciences gradually have acquired a strong ahistor-
ical bias. The mere fact that institutions and customs are ancient does
not give them current value.
Darwinism and marginalism do have their fundamental differences.
Darwinism is mainly an empirical concept. Darwin developed the the-
ory of natural selection after many years of scientific observation, and
his famous work On the Origin of Species attempts to prove its truth
with vast amounts of empirical evidence.5 By contrast, marginalism is a
fundamentally analytic concept. Indeed, in one important sense it can-
not be "verified" at all. We cannot verify or falsify that a person
purchases wine and apples in a combination that equates her marginal
utility for the two because doing so would require both cardinalization
and interpersonal comparison of utilities.' We can show geometrically
or mathematically, however, that a "rational" person will equate margi-
nal utilities in this fashion.
During the Progressive era (roughly 1890-1920), Darwinism and
marginalism were viewed as complementary models of human behavior,
the former emphasizing the relationship between the individual and her
environment and the latter emphasizing the role of individual choice in
determining well-being. The Progressive economists' view that interper-
sonal utility comparisons were appropriate and capable of justifying
state welfare policy7 was really nothing other than an attempt to inte-
grate the Darwinian and the marginalist views of human nature. Dar-
winism told the American Progressive-whether economist,
psychologist, or other social scientist-that basic human needs and
desires are determined principally by the environment. At least at some
level, the things we call "preferences" are those things necessary for
survival. The structure of the human organism's preferences is a prod-
5. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or The Preser-
vation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (Murray, 1859). On the thoroughness of Dar-
win's empirical work, see generally Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin (Warner Books,
1992).
6. However, a variation that applies to business firms can perhaps be verified-namely that
firms purchase inputs so that the marginal gain from all of them is about the same. For example, if
herbicide and weeding by hand are complementary ways of killing weeds, the farmer will purchase
both to the point that the marginal contribution of each in relation to its costs is about the same.
If the farmer's current resources are spent in such a way that an additional dollar on herbicide
kills 100 weeds but an additional dollar on weeding by hand kills 50 weeds, the farmer will invest
somewhat less in hand-weeding and somewhat more in herbicide until the two are equalized. In
this manner he will minimize his weed-removal costs.
7. See discussion in notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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uct of evolution just as much as his straight spine and his cognitive
abilities. As a result, one can discern preferences by studying human
evolution or even the environment itself. This Darwinian model thus
permitted Progressive era economists to speak of "social" as well as in-
dividual wants.' It suggested that human "utility" curves-themselves a
product of evolution-are more or less the same for all individuals, at
least with respect to those basic goods necessary for survival. During
the Progressive era and the years immediately preceeding it, an enor-
mous economics literature imported this rhetoric of marginalism into
the economics of welfare policy and wealth distribution, as well as into
more conventional subjects such as price theory.9
In the 1930s a group of economists we now call the ordinalists, 10
who argued that interpersonal utility comparisons are scientifically im-
possible, cut the knot between marginalism and Darwinism. The
ordinalists believed that one could not measure the amount of utility
that a person received from something so as to permit comparisons of
her utility with that of someone else. In the wake of the ordinalist cri-
tique, the economics of welfare .had to be reconstructed along lines that
were thought not to require interpersonal utility comparisons.11
From that point on economics would not really be a "social" sci-
ence as that term was generally understood. For the ordinalists human
preference became the starting point of economic science; looking to the
environment for the source that had produced a preference was gener-
ally thought to be unscientific or irrelevant. Economics ceased to be an
evolutionary science, but rather adopted a "methodological individual-
ism" that regarded the concept of social preferences as meaningless. 12
A. The Marginalist Revolution
Ideas likes marginalism and Darwinism are mechanisms for form-
ing consensus within the democratic community. The most robust pol-
icy ideas in a republican society are not the consequence of unadorned
8. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42
Stan. L. Rev. 993 (1990).
9. Examples from both early and late in the period include John R. Commons, The Distri-
bution of Wealth 10 (Macmillan, 1893); John Bates Clark, The Ultimate Standard of Value, 1
Yale Rev. 258 (1892); Simmon Patten, The Scope of Political Economy, 2 Yale Rev. 264 (1893);
Frank William Taussig, 1 Principles of Economics (Macmillan, 3d ed. 1921); Jacob Viner, The
Utility Concept in Value Theory and Its Critics (pts. 1 & 2), 33 J. Pol. Econ. 369, 638 (1925).
Numerous other examples are discussed in Hovenkamp, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 993.
10. See Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science
(Macmillan, 1932); Hovenkamp, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 993; note 57 and accompanying text.
11. See, for example, Ian Malcolm David Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics 50-58
(Clarendon, 2d ed. 1957).




selfish preferences, but rather of objective welfare judgments that a cer-
tain course of action is best for a certain circumstance. Although people
who are strongly interested in an outcome may cast all theory aside,
those who are less interested generally take theory into account, often
very strongly. Thus, for example, in the nineteenth century the govern-
ment tended to grant monopoly privileges to bridges, ferries, and rail-
roads, but not to general stores, cobblers, or printers. This allocation
resulted not from the fact that the former class had better lobbyists
than the latter, although sometimes that was perhaps true. Rather, in
addition to their individual preferences, government decisionmakers
also had the makings of a theory of natural monopoly, under which mo-
nopoly grants seemed appropriate for toll bridges but not for cobblers.' 3
Neither Darwinism nor marginalism were autonomous theories.
Both collected their premises from a variety of disciplines; both rested
on arguments developed over the course of a century or more; and both
became tools often used for political ends. Whether either was right or
wrong in the abstract is a matter of little consequence for the historian.
Much more important is the fact that both provided numerous insights
that helped the Progressive era policymaker organize his thoughts and
view problems in a particular way. To the extent the technical argu-
ments were viewed as convincing, they tended to form consensuses
among policymakers and gave democratic policymaking an underlying
rationale apart from the unadorned preferences of participants.
Marginalism is one of those great, simple ideas that seems intui-
tively obvious once explained. In that sense marginalism is much like
Darwin's theory of natural selection as a model for explaining evolution.
For many years people knew that evolution must be true, but were una-
ble to explain why.14
Marginalism originated from the writings of the English utilitari-
ans. Of these, Jeremy Bentham examined utilitarianism's economic im-
plications most carefully. Indeed, he came close to developing an
economic theory of marginal utility as early as 1790, although his work
was not widely appreciated as such. The notions of declining marginal
utility of income and the value of marginal deterrence in criminal law
were both developed in Bentham's Principles and his Theory of Legis-
13. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 3-7 (Harvard, 1991).
14. Two of the most famous failures were Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia, or, The Laws of Or-
ganic Life (T. & J. Swords, 1796) (Erasmus was Charles's grandfather) and Robert Chambers,
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (Churchill, 1844).
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lation.15 Bentham did not come close to developing the theory of margi-
nal cost, however, or theories of value based on marginalism.
Marginalism emerged as a coherent movement within economic
theory in 1871, when Englishman William Stanley Jevons and Austrian
Carl Menger, working separately, published books that sought to com-
bine marginal utility theory with classical economics. Jevons's Theory
of Political Economy"8 broke sharply with the classical tradition by dis-
puting the nearly sacred notion that value depends on the amount of
labor that has gone into something. According to Jevons, "value de-
pends entirely on utility," which was a purely subjective notion and
could be totally unrelated to the amount of previous investment.17 His
Theory developed the economic notion of diminishing marginal util-
ity-the more of something a person already has, the less she will be
willing to pay for an additional unit. From this Jevons developed the
concept of equation of utilities-that a person applying her money to
numerous commodities will purchase an amount of each up to the point
at which she derives the same marginal utility from all.18
Carl Menger's Principles of Economics'" was less influential in the
United States than was Jevons's work because Menger stood outside
the British classical tradition. However, a large number of American
political economy students who went to Europe for graduate study in
the late nineteenth century studied Menger. °
Under marginalism the economic theory of value became entirely
subjective, based on the individual utility function rather than on any
criterion that could be determined from the desired good itself or the
15. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (J.H.
Burns and H.L.A. Hart, eds.) (Athlone, 1970); Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation
(Trtibner, 1864). See discussion in notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
16. Jevons, Theory of Political Economy (cited in note 3). Alfred Marshall also deserves part
of the credit. See J.K. Whitaker, ed., The Early Economic Writings of Alfred Marshall 2 (Macmil-
lan, 1975). For a thoughtful perspective on the rise of marginalism, see D.E. Moggridge, Maynard
Keynes: An Economist's Biography 84-86 (Routledge, 1992). John Bates Clark in the United
States probably came to his marginalism independently. See John Bates Clark, The Philosophy of
Wealth, chs. 4-5 (Ginn & Co., 1887); Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 870 (Ox-
ford, 1954).
17. Jevons, Theory of Political Economy at 2 (cited in note 3) (emphasis omitted) (stating
that "we have only to trace out carefully the natural laws of the variation of utility, as depending
upon the quantity of commodity in our possession, in order to arrive at a satisfactory theory of
exchange").
18. William S. Jevons, Theory of Political Economy 59-60 (Macmillan, 3d ed. 1888) (stating
that "when the person remains satisfied with the distribution he has made, it follows that.., an
increment of commodity would yield exactly as much utility in one use as in another").
19. Carl Menger, Principles of Economics (Wilhelm Braumfiller, 1871).
20. For a discussion of the influence of German historicism on Progressive Era economics, see
Hovenkamp, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 996-97 (cited in note 8); Ross, American Social Science at 104-05
(cited in note 2); Mary Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of
American Social Science, 1865-1905 50-57 (Kentucky, 1975).
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environment in which a choice was made. As a result, marginalism
forced a shift in economics methodology from the measure of goods or
the environment in which they were contained to the measure of human
behavior. To state it differently, economics' basis of measurement
moved from an essentially natural science model to a model based on
presumed rationality or observed individual behavior. One no longer
measured value by looking at the amount of a good that was available
or the historical cost of producing it; one needed to measure individual
willingness to pay for the good. The great marginalist Alfred Marshall
knew that the whole notion of subjective preference meant nothing at
all unless it could be measured behaviorally. Thus, one could speak
meaningfully of consumer demand only "as represented by the schedule
of the prices at which [one] is willing to buy different amounts of some-
thing. 12 1 In his highly influential eighth edition, Marshall wrote:
If then we wish to compare... physical gratifications, we must do it not directly,
but indirectly by the incentives which they afford to action. If the desire to secure
either of two pleasures will induce people in similar circumstances each to do just
an hour's extra work, or induce men in the same rank of life and with the same
means each to pay a shilling for it; we then can say that those pleasures are equal
for our purposes, because the desires for them are equally strong incentives to ac-
tion for persons under similar conditions. 2
Within Anglo-American economics marginalism was undoubtedly
the biggest revolution in thought since Adam Smith. Indeed, marginal-
ism seems to explain so many problems faced by the classical political
economists that its implications are still being explored more than a
century after the concept was originally elaborated.
The principal problem faced by classical political economy had
been to explain why people and firms produce and consume mixtures of
goods, even though the goods appear to have widely different values.
The classicists also struggled to explain value itself. Why is air cheap
even though it is essential for survival? Why are diamonds expensive
even though they are luxuries? A more technical problem also faced by
the classical political economists had been identifying a "cost" and de-
termining the relationship between the cost of a good or service and its
value.
To illustrate some of these problems and their marginalist solu-
tions, consider the person whose favorite experience is eating peach ice
cream. Why doesn't this person purchase and consume tons of peach ice
cream and nothing else? After all, he prefers a dollar's worth of peach
ice cream to a dollar's worth of any other product. Such questions so
vexed the classical political economists that they generally resorted to
21. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 158 (Macmillan, 1890).
22. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 15-16 (Macmillan, 8th ed. 1920).
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elaborate theories of objective value or "primary" goods, or to meta-
physical explanations such as that people have a basic nature or biologi-
cal structure that requires them to consume a particular mixture of
goods. Such explanations were totally unhelpful, however, in explaining
the manifold differences one could observe in the choices of different
individuals. Classical political economy generally settled on the rather
ambiguous notion that the value of a good was a function of its cost.
But once again, that theory did not explain why different people placed
widely different values on one unit of a good even though its cost was
the same everywhere. Furthermore, pre-marginalist economics had only
the poorest conception of what a "cost" really was; all costs had to be
stated as either totals or averages, neither of which seemed determina-
tive of profitability or rate of output.
In the case of the peach ice cream, the marginalist answer was so
elegant and obvious that it appeared to be the key to almost every
question about individual and social value. Even the person whose fa-
vorite experience is eating peach ice cream experiences declining margi-
nal utility for it. The value of each additional quart of peach ice cream
declines as he accumulates more. He will buy peach ice cream until the
utility derived from the next unit of peach ice cream has fallen to a
level equal to his marginal utility from some other good, such as broc-
coli. For example, suppose he obtains twenty utils2 3 of utility from his
first quart of peach ice cream. Saying that his favorite experience is
eating peach ice cream is equivalent to saying that the value he places
on this first unit of peach ice cream is greater than the value he places
on the first unit of any other good. However, this person will not likely
value a second quart of peach ice cream by quite as much as the first
and almost certainly will not value the 100th quart as much as the first.
Suppose he obtains twenty utils from the first quart of peach ice cream,
eighteen utils from the second, sixteen from the third, and so on in lin-
ear fashion. By contrast, he obtains five utils from his first pound of
broccoli, four from the second, and so on.
The classicists, not having the concept of marginal utility, observed
only that the subject preferred peach ice cream to broccoli and were
hard pressed to explain why he purchased any broccoli at all. The
marginalists, by contrast, would draw remarkably precise conclusions
from the above numbers. Assume that peach ice cream costs one dollar
per quart, broccoli costs one dollar per pound, and the subject has ten
dollars to spend. He would buy eight quarts of ice cream and two
pounds of broccoli. Once he had seven quarts of ice cream the marginal
utility from the next quart would be four utils. At that point an addi-
23. A "util" is an imaginary unit of satisfaction.
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tional dollar spent on a pound of broccoli would give him five utils of
utility, but another quart of peach ice cream would produce only four.
A utility maximizer would buy a pound of broccoli. Then, with two dol-
lars left he would face three options. First, he could buy two additional
quarts of ice cream, which would produce four utils from the first and
two utils from the second for a total of six utils. Second, he could buy
two additional pounds of broccoli, which would yield four utils and
three utils, respectively, for a total of seven. Last, he could buy one
additional quart of ice cream and one additional pound of broccoli,
which would produce four utils each for a total of eight utils. Thus, he
would buy one of each, giving him a total of eight quarts of peach ice
cream and two pounds of broccoli.
Neoclassicism produced several important corollaries from the sim-
ple statement of marginalism described above. First, when people place
value on goods that they consider purchasing, only the marginal value,
not the total value, is relevant. Second, people tend to distribute utili-
ties evenly over their entire set of purchasing decisions. Presumptively,
every person's stock of goods is such that the marginal values the per-
son places on these goods are all precisely identical. To the extent they
are not, she corrects the situation the next time she purchases by buy-
ing whatever has the highest marginal value.
Third, business firms, whose goal is to maximize profits, also equal-
ize marginal utilities, which they measure as marginal expenditures and
marginal revenues. For example, in deciding what inputs to use in mak-
ing a product, a firm maximizes its profits by using each input up to a
point at which its marginal cost is identical to the marginal cost of
every other input. If labor and machinery are alternative inputs and the
current cost of labor is five dollars per unit of value produced but the
current cost of machinery is four dollars per unit, a firm will invest in
more machinery and less labor until the marginal costs of each are
equalized. Likewise, in deciding what combination of products to pro-
duce, a firm produces each product up to the point at which the margi-
nal profit from producing an additional unit of the product is equalized.
Thus, for example, if a firm makes widgets and gidgets and additional
gidgets can be sold at a profit of $1.50 but additional widgets can be
sold at a profit of one dollar, the firm will make relatively more gidgets
and relatively less widgets. It will continue making this adjustment un-
til the marginal profitability of each is the same or until the rate of
widget production falls to zero, whichever occurs first.
Thus, marginalism provided economics with the basis for a general
theory of consumer demand, a theory of value, a theory about produc-
tion and consumption, and a theory of costs, all of which could be
quantified with great apparent mathematical precision, although mea-
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surement problems remained difficult. Because of marginalism, neoclas-
sical economics became more coherent and rigorous than classicism had
ever hoped to be.
As a theory about how people exercise preferences, marginalism
seemed so powerful that people seldom questioned it. Some of its impli-
cations, however, were controversial and accepted either with great re-
luctance or not at all. For example, in economics marginalism holds
that the rate of wages is a function of the marginal contribution that
the laborer makes. If a particular laborer adds value of five dollars per
hour to an employer's production, then "at the margin" the employer
will be willing to pay the worker five dollars. He may pay less if he can,
but as soon as wages rise above five dollars he will refuse to hire. This
relatively simple notion displaced nearly a century of classical theory,
which had concluded that the rate of wages was a function of previously
invested capital. For many Progressive era policymakers, the move from
the pre-marginalist "wage-fund" theory to the marginal productivity
theory justified increased toleration for labor unions and even minimum
wage legislation. 4
Likewise, ever since John Locke the Anglo-American theory of
property rights had placed a strong emphasis on labor. Private property
had value precisely to the extent that a person had mixed nature's raw
materials with his own labor. But as John Maynard Keynes noted in his
student notes of 1905, previously expended labor has no impact on
value if value is a function of marginal desire or willingness to pay.25
Perhaps the most serious problem facing advocates of marginalism
at the turn of the century, the time when basic models for the social
sciences were being formed, was that marginalism seemed to be based
on a narrow view of humanity that did not take the theory of evolution
into account. For example, Thorstein Veblen criticized marginalist eco-
nomics for not being an "evolutionary" science.2 6 That opening state-
ment began a dialogue that continues to this day over whether
neoclassical economics' vision of human choice is too narrow to give a
realistic accounting of welfare.
B. The Relationship Between Marginalist and Darwinian Models
During the 1950s and 1960s, American intellectual historians heav-
ily reified Social Darwinism in their writing about the Gilded Age and
24. See discussion in notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
25. See Robert Skidelsky, 1 John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed, 1883-1920 165 (Mac-
millan, 1983).




the Progressive era. 7 Indeed, Social Darwinism is still the fashionable
paradigm for explaining liberty of contract and the Supreme Court's
general laissez-faire position after the turn of the century.
28
Nonetheless, one viewing mainstream legal writing during this pe-
riod is struck by the absence of explicit references to Social Darwinist
rhetoric. 29 Historians have been quite willing to assign Darwinism as
the cause of the legal revolution of the turn of the century, even though
this theory has only the thinnest support in the writings of the period's
legal scholars themselves. For example, even though Oliver Wendell
Holmes's professional career stretched over more than sixty years, his
writings include a scant half dozen references to Darwin, and even these
are sufficiently ambiguous that scholars still debate whether Holmes
was in fact a Social Darwinist. 0 A somewhat stronger case exists for
tying Roscoe Pound to Reform Darwinism, but the record hardly sug-
gests that Darwinism permeated his thought .3 Although both Holmes
and Pound undoubtedly were influenced by Darwinian ideas, a strong
argument can be made that both thinkers were complex and did not
automatically fall for the popular literary philosophies of the day.32
Darwin's principal contribution to evolution, an idea that long an-
tedated his own time, was to cast the problem of the development of
species in economic terms: because nature produces many more individ-
uals than any given environment can support, they must compete with
one another to survive. Only those best adapted to their particular envi-
ronment survive long enough to have offspring. These lucky few then
pass along the characteristics that enabled them to survive, and the
process begins anew with the next generation. Darwinism, just like
classical and neoclassical economics, began with the premise that re-
sources are relatively scarce.
27. See, for example, Robert Green McCloskey, American Conservatism in the Age of Enter-
prise 26-30 (Harvard, 1951); Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought 60-63
and passim (Brazillier, 1959); Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State 84-85
(Michigan, 1964). Henry S. Commager, The American Mind 359-73 (Yale, 1950).
28. See, for example, Paul Kens, Judicial Power and Reform Politics: the Anatomy of Loch-
ner v. New York 67-68 (Kansas, 1990).
29. See, for example, Arnold M. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of
Bar and Bench, 1887-1895 (Cornell, 1960). Paul, while attributing the rise of laissez faire conserva-
tism among lawyers to Social Darwinism, concedes that nearly none of the hundreds of lawyers'
speeches that he read contained references to Herbert Spencer. Id. at 22-23 & n.10.
30. On the theory of evolution and Holmes, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443, 449 (1899); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Primitive Notions in
Modern Law, 10 Am. L. Rev. 422, 429-30 (1876). See also John Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes,
Holmes and Evolution, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 343 (1984); E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal
Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. Legal Stud. 113 (1984).
31. See David Wigdor, Roscoe Pound 55-62 (Greenwood, 1974).
32. See Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 656-664 (Holmes) and 677-683 (Pound) (cited in note
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One should not push the analogies between Darwinism and eco-
nomics too far, however, because there are stark differences between
them, most of which emerged after the turn of the century. Most im-
portant, Darwinism originated in the natural sciences while marginal-
ism originated in philosophy and economics. One consequence is that
Darwinism identifies biological need as the source of preference and
value, while marginalism generally ties its explanations to a concept of
individual rationality. For the Darwinist, people are principally bodies,
and the mind is part of the body; for the marginalist economist people
are mainly minds, and the body is simply an appendage that stands to
benefit from the choices that the mind makes.
This difference in emphasis-Darwinism on biological need and
marginalism on rationality-explains the greatest divide between Dar-
winism and marginalism: their respective methodologies of scientific in-
vestigation. Darwinian models adopt biological theories of choice and
attempt to prove those theories through the use of objective data about
survival, health, welfare, and the like. To that end, Darwinian models
are heavily empirical and rely on a great deal of data. By contrast,
marginalism adopts rationalistic theories of choice and tends to prove
them with observations of exercised preferences; thus, the marginalist's
data tends to be subjective. 33 For example, if a Darwinian social scien-
tist were asked to study the need for shelter, she would conduct medical
studies about the impact that lack of adequate shelter has on the occur-
rence of illness, uncompleted pregnancies, fatigue, and the like. If a
marginalist were asked the same question, he would attempt to deter-
mine how individual actors ranked shelter in their preference orderings.
The Darwinian model generally asks "what do people need?" while the
marginalist model inquires "what do people choose?" Further, under
marginalism the presumed choice by a rational person often becomes
the datum for analysis rather than a choice observed under restricted
conditions.
Darwinian models tend to emphasize those things that make people
the same-people are, after all, biological organisms of the same species
responding to an environment that is more-or-less common to all. Al-
though individuals might vary a great deal, those individuals that suc-
ceed against the odds tend to have important characteristics in
common. By contrast, emphasis on individuality is set deep in
marginalism.
Marginalism and Darwinism were so powerful that they quickly
spilled over into other disciplines. Much has been written about the in-




fluence of Darwinism on the social sciences, philosophy, and literature.
Much less has been written about the influence of marginalism. Indeed,
intellectual historians have been inclined to kee the entire Progressive
revolution in the social sciences in Darwinian terms. They have as-
signed to Darwinism influences that more appropriately belong to
marginalism. For example, although the era of liberty of contract often
has been characterized as a triumph of Social Darwinism in American
thought, 4 the doctrine reflects much more an economic, marginalist
view of the world than a biological, Darwinian view. 5 Lester Frank
Ward, a contemporary Darwinian and one of the Progressive critics of
laissez-faire ideology, complained bitterly two years after Lochner v.
New Yorks' that the name "Social Darwinism" did not fit the ideology
it was used to describe. "I have never seen any distinctively Darwinian
principle appealed to in the discussions of 'Social Darwinism.' It is
therefore wholly inappropriate to characterize as social Darwinism the
laissez-faire doctrine of political economists."37
Another example is the American philosophy of Pragmatism, which
is often explained in explicitly Darwinian terms.3 8 The essence of Prag-
matism is that human responses are situational-that is, driven by the
immediate environment. Thus, Pragmatism naturally begins with the
premise that human beings are evolving biological organisms whose
most basic instinct is survival. As soon as Pragmatism reaches particu-
lars, however, this basic instinct is stated in a much more precise fash-
ion-not as survival generally, but as maximization of one's position in
life.3
Darwinian and marginalist impulses simultaneously drove the mod-
ernization of legal ideas that took place after the turn of the century. If
economics and the social sciences could not easily integrate the two and
34. See, for example, Kermit Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History 190 (Oxford,
1989); Kens, Judicial Power and Reform Politics at 67-68 (cited in note 28). McCloskey, American
Conservatism at 26-30 (cited in note 27); Hofstadter, Social Darwinism at 60-63 and passim (cited
in note 27); Fine, Laissez Faire at 84-85 (cited in note 27); Commager, The American Mind at 359-
73 (cited in note 27).
35. See Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law chs. 14-17 (cited in note 13).
36. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
37. Lester F. Ward, Social and Biological Struggle, 13 Am. J. Soc. 289, 292 (1907) (emphasis
in original), quoted in Carl N. Degler, In Search of Human Nature: the Decline and Revival of
Darwinism in American Social Thought 12 (Oxford, 1991).
38. See, for example, Philip Paul Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism
(Harvard, 1949).
39. For illustrations, see Elizabeth Flower and Murray Murphey, 2 A History of Philosophy
in America chs. 9-11, 13-14 (Putnam, 1977) (discussing Chauncey Wright, C.S. Peirce, William
James, George Santayana, and John Dewey). Important examples include Chauncey Wright, The
Evolution of Self-Consciousness, 116 N. Am. Rev. 245 (1873). For expressly legal applications, see
Fowler Vincent Harper, Pragmatist Process in Law, 41 Int'l J. Ethics 305 (28-31) (1930); Fowler
Vincent Harper, Some Implications of Juristic Pragmatism, 39 Int'l J. Ethics 269 (1928).
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make them pull in tandem, legal theory showed no such reluctance. In
numerous areas legal thought began with the essentially Darwinian and
fundamentally anti-economic premise that human beings are biological
creatures whose preferences are determined by their environments, but
then applied to these generic people a set of criteria based on the pre-
sumption that human beings "maximize" in the marginalist sense of the
term.
In the process legal policymakers developed a broader, less purist
attitude toward these two models of human behavior than did either
economists or more Darwinian social scientists. Legal scholars were less
hampered by methodological constraints under which the adoption of
one model required the exclusion of the other. They often saw Darwin-
ism and marginalism as analogues. The instinct to survive explained
human values and actions in Darwinian social science, particularly in
the writings of William James and John Dewey.40 The desire to maxi-
mize one's satisfactions, by contrast, explained marginalism. At bottom
the Darwinian statement was simply the gross version and the
marginalist statement the more refined version of the same concept.
The "survival instinct" in Darwinian social science was nothing other
than the marginalist instinct to maximize one's satisfaction.
A few American Progressive economists advocated the use of Dar-
winian genetic models for economics. For example, when Veblen com-
plained that neoclassical economics, unlike the other social science, was
not "evolutionary," his picture of evolution was distinctly genetic. 41 As
a result, economics, like the other social sciences, had to look at the
more natural laws of the harder sciences. 42 During the 1910s and 1920s,
several prominent American economists advocated looking to biological
or environmental sources for information about the source of prefer-
ence. This would enable economists to speak of the preferences of
groups rather than of individuals.43
40. See, for example, Flower and Murphey, 2 History of Philosophy chs. 11 (William James)
and 14 (John Dewey).
'41. Veblen, 12 Q. J. Econ. at 378-88 (cited in note 26).
42. For a more recent argument, see Jack Hirshleifer, Economics from a Biological View-
point, 20 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1977).
43. See, for example, John Maurice Clark, Economics and Modern Psychology, 26 J. Pol.
Econ. 1, 7 (1918); John Maurice Clark, The Concept of Value-A Rejoinder, 29 Q. J. Econ. 709,
712 (1915); Wesley C. Mitchell, The Rationality of Economic Activity, 18 J. Pol. Econ. 97, 197
(1910); Wesley C. Mitchell, Human Behavior and Economics: A Survey of the Literature, 29 Q. J.
Econ. 1, 2 (1914); Walton Hamilton, The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory, 9 Am.
Econ. Rev. Supp. 316 (1919).
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C. Individualistic and Reform Impulses in Darwinism and
Marginalism
Most great ideas are fated to have mutually hostile followers. Thus
the Hegelian left produced Karl Marx and the Hegelian right Adolph
Hitler. Darwinism and marginalism were no exceptions.
Darwinism engendered a right-wing ideology, generally called So-
cial Darwinism, that emphasized the individual in struggle with others
for survival and that regarded the outcome of that struggle as essential
for the betterment of the human race. Attempts to interfere in the
struggle, such as through state redistribution of wealth, could lead only
to retardation of the evolutionary process or perhaps even to
degradation.""
By contrast, Reform Darwinists began with the observation that
human beings, unlike the world's other organisms, know that they are
involved in an evolutionary process and are therefore in a position to
control it. Perhaps by manipulating the environment one could improve
upon nature's own process. Reform Darwinists had only to look at selec-
tive breeding under domestication to prove their point. One of Darwin's
most important contributions to evolutionary theory was his study of
variation of species under domestication.45 The study was designed to
bolster the argument that the difference between natural selection and
planned selection was the speed at which the process moved-the for-
mer taking millions of years to do what the latter did in a few genera-
tions. Darwin's purpose in writing it was to combat those who were
unable to excise God from their biological world views-that is, those
who accepted the basic selection paradigm but viewed it as divinely di-
rected rather than purely random. The important thesis of Darwin's
Domestication book was that when natural and planned selection are
compared, the latter forces species to change much more quickly than
the former. Furthermore, the farmer or stock breeder can breed selec-
tively to produce the kinds of organisms he desires.
For Reformed Darwinists the policy conclusion was clear: if the
state wants to accelerate the evolutionary process or control its direc-
tion, planned selection is the solution. As a result, the Progressive Re-
form agenda to hasten human improvement included such devices as
sterilization of the unfit.4" These Progressive social reformers were just
as "Darwinist" as the Social Darwinists were, but their ideas spun off
44. For general discussions, see Hofstadter, Social Darwinism (cited in note 27); Fine, Lais-
sez Faire (cited in note 27); Commager, American Mind (cited in note 27).
45. Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication (John Mur-
ray, 1868).
46. See notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
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the basic Darwinian paradigm in precisely the opposite direction. Be-
cause they believed that "artificial" selection could be better than "nat-
ural" selection, they had very strong ideas about the use of the state to
interfere in natural forces.
Marginalism also inspired left- and right-wing movements. The
earlier marginalists believed that interpersonal comparisons of cardinal
utilities were a feasible and legitimate function of government. Further,
because welfare was maximized when utilities were equalized, early
marginalists believed that the state could make society wealthier by re-
distributing its wealth. Beginning in the 1890s, marginalism inspired a
new social liberalism and statism in English economic thought.41
However, marginalism also inspired a right-wing reaction. For ex-
ample, John Bates Clark repeatedly emphasized that the principle con-
cern of marginalist analysis had to be incentives rather than outcomes.
Incentives are maximized when each person receives precisely his mar-
ginal contribution to society, no more and no less. Minimum wage laws,
unionization, and social welfare programs were inefficient attempts to
give people more than they contributed.4 s
Right-wing marginalism triumphed within economic theory with
the rise of ordinalism in the 1930s. Once interpersonal utility compari-
sons were proclaimed to be unacceptable science, the marginalist case
for a social welfare state appeared to fall apart, and neoclassical eco-
nomics took a very sharp turn to the right. Ordinalism generally carried
the day in economic theory, at least as practiced in American universi-
ties. Eventually it won out in most areas of legal analysis as well. The
result was to strengthen greatly the economic case for the unregulated
market and to undermine the economic case for the social welfare
state.49
To justify its conclusions about interpersonal noncompatibility of
utilities, the marginalist right had to divorce marginalism from Darwin-
ism. Thus, in modern economics the important fact is that people make
choices, not that they are biological organisms with certain genetically
produced needs. Economists seldom ask what the source of human pref-
erence is. For the ordinalist getting behind the preferences is simply not
a part of economic science. De gustibus non est disputandum.50
47. See Hovenkamp, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 1000-1002 (cited in note 8). See also notes 53-56 and
accompanying text.
48. See John Bates Clark, The Distribution of Wealth; A Theory of Wages, Interest and
Profits (Macmillan, 1899); John Bates Clark, The Law of Wages and Interest, 1 Annals, Am. Acad.
Pol. & Soc. Sci. 43 (1890); John Bates Clark, Possibility of a Scientific Law of Wages, 4 Pub. Am.
Econ. Assn. 37 (1889).
49. See Hovenkamp, 42 Stan L. Rev. at 1033-1038 (cited in note 8).
50. That is, there is no disputing among tastes. But see George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker,
De gustibus non est disputandum, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 76 (1977) (arguing that economics should
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The gap between pre-ordinalist and ordinalist marginalism is wide,
particularly with respect to welfare policy. The former viewed classical
utilitarianism as a device for determining social welfare. As such it gen-
erally required interpersonal utility comparisons.5 1 Pre-ordinalist
marginalism generally justified these judgments with essentially Dar-
winian arguments that people's "utility functions" for primary goods
are essentially the same because they have developed in response to a
common environmental situation. By contrast, the ordinalists lost their
concern with the source or nature of preferences and proclaimed them
to be noncomparable.
II. MARGINALISM IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
Marginalism worked its way into American law in the late decades
of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth, about
the same time that Darwinism became an important intellectual force
in the law. The marginalist revolution in legal thought developed in
three broadly defined but distinct areas. First, the marginalist revolu-
tion had a strong impact on the welfare agenda of the Progressive era.
The notion that social welfare would be maximized when marginal utili-
ties were equalized, coupled with the idea that interpersonal utility
comparisons were possible and appropriate, was thought to justify
rather broad policies of transferring wealth by legislation. Although
these theories became formalized in neoclassical economics in the late
nineteenth century, they were well-developed in work by Jeremy Ben-
tham that had been generally overlooked in American writing to that
time.
In his theory of legislation, Bentham outlined a broad program of
wealth redistribution based on marginal utility theory, which allowed
interpersonal comparisons. For example, Bentham observed that al-
though people acquire more absolute happiness from additional wealth,
the proportion of happiness increases more slowly than the proportion
of wealth. To cast this observation into marginalist idiom, people expe-
rience declining marginal utility of income. As a result, argued Ben-
tham, as wealth became equalized, total social happiness would
increase. Again, although Bentham did not use the term "marginalism,"
he undoubtedly was thinking in marginalist terms, for he spoke of the
distribution of "new wealth," that is, of the marginal increment:
take the position that efficient consumers with perfect information will in fact develop identical
tastes or, at least, that economists should treat them as if they do).
51. For example, one cannot identify the worst off individual in John Rawls's Theory of Jus-
tice without engaging in interpersonal utility comparisons. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
150-58 (Harvard, 1971); Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory
of Justice, 70 J. Phil. 245 (1973).
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"Among participants of unequal fortunes, the more the distribution of
new wealth tends to do away with that inequality, the greater will be
the total mass of happiness."52 From this principle, Bentham drew the
corollary that "the greater the number of persons among whom a loss is
shared, the less considerable will be the defalcation from the sum total
of happiness.""3 That is, given declining marginal utility of income, in-
terpersonally comparable utilities, and equal wealth, assigning a five
dollar loss to one person would produce greater unhappiness than as-
signing a one dollar loss to each of five different people. Each successive
dollar taken from a person's wealth would produce a larger consequence
than the previous dollar. The result was a system of social insurance in
which catastrophic individual losses were to be spread over the mem-
bers of society.54
The marginal utility economists of the late nineteenth century re-
fined Bentham's observations and quantified them, but their message
was basically the same. If the involuntary transferors were wealthy,
their marginal utility for money would be relatively small; if the trans-
ferees were poor, their marginal utility would be high. If such a transfer
itself had no social cost or impact on total wealth,55 it would increase
the total utility level. During the Progressive Era economists turned
marginal utility theory into a broad-based economic argument for state
control of resource allocation and redistribution of wealth. This argu-
ment for forced wealth redistribution, which was accepted in one form
or another by prominent neoclassical economists like Alfred Marshall
and Arthur C. Pigou in England and Richard T. Ely in the United
States, dominated the Progressive welfare agenda until its foundations
were undermined by the ordinalist critique of the 1930s.5
Ordinalism asserted that Progressive welfare judgments required
unscientific, impermissible interpersonal utility comparisons. That is,
one might be able to show that for any individual the marginal value of
her millionth dollar is less than the marginal value of her first; however,
that fact says nothing about whether a wealth transfer from millionaire
A to pauper B would increase welfare because there is no way of estab-
lishing that A and B have the same or even similar utility functions. A
might very well receive more utility from his millionth dollar than B
52. Bentham, Theory of Legislation at 105 (cited in note 15) (emphasis omitted).
53. Id. at 106.
54. Id. at 107-08.
55. Negative effects such as these would result if (1) the transaction costs of the transfer
were substantial, (2) the transfer had negative effects on incentives to produce, or (3) the transfer
had harmful effects on third parties.
56. See generally Hovenkamp, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 993 (cited in note 8).
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receives from her first.5 7 This important attribute of Progressive legisla-
tive policy has been recounted before, and I will not repeat it here. 8
Second, marginalism encouraged the further development of theo-
ries of criminal and civil liability based on marginal deterrence. Once
again, an important but often unacknowledged source of the theories
was Bentham, who had developed a set of rules for proportioning pun-
ishment to offenses that were based strictly on a comparison of the
marginal gains from the offense and the marginal losses from the pun-
ishment. Bentham's first rule of punishment was that "[t]he evil of the
punishment must be made to exceed the advantage of the offence." 59
His second rule was "[tihe more deficient in certainty a punishment is,
the severer it should be."'6 0 The most clearly marginalist of Bentham's
rules was his third: "[w]here two offences are in conjunction, the greater
offence ought to be subjected to severer punishment, in order that the
delinquent may have a motive to stop at the lesser.""' As Bentham ex-
plained: "A highwayman may content himself with robbing, or he may
begin with murder, and finish with robbery. The murder should be pun-
ished more severely than the robbery, in order to deter him from the
greater offence. '62
In the Fourth Part of his Theory of Legislation, Bentham devel-
oped more elaborate rules for giving effect to these utilitarian theories,
including how to diminish the uncertainty of prosecutions and punish-
ment6 3 and how to improve people's knowledge of the relevant law and
facts.64 Except for the technical notation, Bentham had developed fully
an economic theory of crime and punishment similar to that applied in
law and economics today.65
These theories reemerged simultaneously in Progressive social sci-
ence and Progressive legal theory. For the marginalist law's only rele-
57. Robbins, Nature and Significance of Economic Science at 123-24 (cited in note 10).
58. See Hovenkamp, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 1000-1013. See also Arthur Ekirch, Jr., Progressiv-
ism in America: A Study of the Era of Theodore Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson chs. 5-7 (New
Viewpoints, 1974).
59. Bentham, Theory of Legislation at 325 (cited in note 15) (emphasis omitted). Bentham
made quite clear that he was speaking of incentives operating at the margin: "[T]o prevent an
offence, it is necessary that the repressive motive should be stronger than the seductive motive."
Id.
60. Id. Said Bentham, "In all cases of offence there is a calculation of the chances for and
against; and it is necessary to give a much greater weight to the punishment, in order to counter-
balance the chances of impunity." Id. at 326.
61. Id. at 326 (emphasis omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 419-22.
64. Id. at 402-14, 445-49.
65. See, for example, Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
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vant concern was external conduct. Penalties had to be assessed in such
a manner that provided appropriate sanctions for disapproved conduct
yet did not discourage beneficial conduct. This was the principal
marginalist message of Holmes's The Common Law, a book whose gen-
eral outlook on legal policy was far more marginalist than it was
Darwinian.6
Finally, and most technically, marginalism had a powerful impact
on legal theories of value, an area that had always vexed the classical
economists. The marginalist answer, as described above, was simple and
elegant. It was also scientific in the sense that it attempted to separate
concepts of value from natural law. Finally, it was behaviorist in the
sense that it divorced value from previous investment, which had no
impact on current behavior. Value was a function of marginal willing-
ness to pay, nothing more. The result of this transformation, however,
was that the concept of value became forward- rather than backward-
looking and became more concerned with potential for growth than pre-
vious commitment. This conceptual change had a remarkable impact on
the legal valuation of certain property rights. One area was the dis-
placement of the wage-fund theory by the marginal productivity theory
of wages. 67 Another was an important change in corporate finance the-
ory concerning the appropriate mechanism for valuing corporate
shares.6
Another influence of marginalism was the Progressive era expan-
sion of the concept of property from land or physical objects to various
intangibles.6 9 The focus, quite simply, shifted from a regime that identi-
fied legally recognized property on the basis of previously committed
investment, occupancy, or discovery, to one that identified property
66. See discussion in notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
67. Marginalism also played an important role in other developments in the law, which this
Article will not explore in any detail. One was the development of new concepts of economic coer-
cion in antitrust and labor law. Within the classical paradigm people were thought to be free to
make economic choices unless they were actually forbidden or contractually excluded from making
them. By contrast, the neoclassical paradigm developed the much more subtle concepts of surplus
and reservation price for measuring the coercive force of such practices as cartels, labor unions,
and concerted refusals to deal. Under marginalist models a person could be "coerced" even though
the form of the coercion was simply a higher asking price. The result was that both antitrust and
labor law developed a growing hostility toward ever more subtle restraints that interfered with the
market. See Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law at 268-95 (cited in note 13).
68. See notes 161-221 and accompanying text.
69. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Devel-
opment of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 Buff. L. Rev. 325 (1980). The leading Progressive
Era marginalist who incorporated this change in his writing on law and economics was John R.
Commons. See John R. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Macmillan, 1924);
Hovenkamp, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 1025-31 (cited in note 8).
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with the captured ability to earn future profits."0 Another was the rise
of a "neoclassical" conception of contract law, which replaced the
Langdellian view that contract law was simply a method for enforcing
agreements respecting the exchange of previously acquired entitle-
ments. Rather, contracts came to be viewed as establishing ongoing,
jointly maximizing relationships between the parties in which each was
unable to predict the future perfectly. 1 Still another development was
the emerging debate in the law of regulated industries over whether
capital should be evaluated on the basis of historical cost or alternative
measures, which included capacity to earn a profit or replacement
cost.
7 2
The culmination of the marginalist revolution in law was the Coase
Theorem7 3 and the development of the modern law and economics
movement-a revision of legal theory that is vehemently anti-Darwin-
ian and promarginalist in its outlook on the origins and significance of
human motives and actions. One thesis of this Article is that the
marginalist revolution in legal thought long antedates the rise of the
modern law and economics movement.
A. Marginalism and American Legal History
The relation between American law and the theory of evolution has
been the subject of an enormous literature that stretches back to the
beginning of this century and even earlier.7 4 By contrast, the historical
70. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of
Legal Orthodoxy 145-46 (Oxford, 1992).
71. See principally Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Rela-
tions Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978);
Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089
(1981). For a preliminary historical account, see Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract
Law, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829, 830-36 (1983).
72. See, for example, Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Con-
cept, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 209 (1922) (arguing that, although replacement cost or capacity to earn a
profit was the proper measure of valuation for unregulated industries in cases involving eminent
domain and the like, in the area of price regulated utilities the appropriate rule was historical
cost). See also Robert L. Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases, 30 Yale L. J. 710
(1921); Robert L. Hale, Valuation and Rate-Making, 80 Colum. Univ. Studies in Hist., Econ. and
Pub. L. (1918). Several price regulated utilities attempted to state their value at replacement cost
rather than historical cost and thus ran the risk of being found guilty of stock "watering." See, for
example, Ohio & Colo. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Colo., 187 P. 1082 (Colo.
1920). On the watered stock controversy, see notes 160-210 and accompanying text.
73. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
74. See Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 645 (cited in note 2); Margaret Gruter and Paul Bohan-
nan, eds., Law, Biology & Culture: The Evolution of Law (Ross-Erickson, 1983); E. Donald Elliott,
The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 38 (1985); Elliott, 13 J. Legal
Stud. 113 (cited in note 30); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57
(1984); Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law, 4 Res. L. Econ. 167 (1982);
Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 Yale L. J. 1238 (1981); Rich-
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impact of marginal utility theory on the law has been largely ignored. 8
The principal exceptions are the studies of the English utilitarians,
which generally deal with utilitarianism as a classical British philoso-
phy rather than as a way of organizing economics. 76 Nonetheless, the
economic model explains more of the jurisprudential revolution of the
Progressive Era than does the biological model associated with Darwin.
Why has Darwinism achieved so much more notoriety than
marginalism? Part of the answer is that the Darwinian model drew the
line between the old and the new with such ferocity. As a result, the
story of the Darwinian revolution provides an intellectual excitement
that the more technical story of marginalism cannot match. The theory
of natural selection produced biological images that threatened both
the traditional view of the nature of humanity and traditional Christian
beliefs.
Ultimately marginalism's depiction of human nature is probably as
inconsistent with traditional Christian ethics as the Darwinian view.
Nevertheless, at the turn of the century, marginalism did not appear to
conflict with traditional Christian beliefs in the way Darwinism did.
77
William Jennings Bryan and the American fundamentalists were never
ard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. Legal Stud. 253 (1980); George L.
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Stud. 65 (1977);
Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Stud. 51 (1977). See also Peter
Stein, Legal Evolution: the Story of an Idea (Cambridge, 1980); Paul L. Rosen, The Supreme
Court and Social Science (1972) (especially Chapter Two: "Social Darwinism in the Law and the
Rise of Sociological Jurisprudence").
For some of the most important historical sources, see Frederick Pollock, Essays in the Law
10-11 (Macmillan, 1922) (discussing the influence of Darwin on legal history); Henry S. Maine,
Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas
(J. Murray, 1861). See also Jacob H. Landman, Primitive Law, Evolution, and Sir Henry Sumner
Maine, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 404 (1930); James Coolidge Carter, Law: Its Origin Growth and Function
(G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru-
dence, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 591, 598-604 (1911); Lewis Henry Morgan, Ancient Society 525-50 (Holt,
1877). The most elaborate Progressive era study of the relation between law and evolution is Al-
bert Kocourek and John H. Wigmore, eds., Evolution of Law: Select Readings on the Origin and
Development of Legal Institutions (3 vols. 1915-1918.).
75. There have been only a limited number of historical studies of marginalism in economics.
See, for example, George J. Stigler, The Development of Marginal Utility Theory, 1, 58 J. Pol.
Econ. 307 (1950); R.D. Collison Black, A.W. Coats, and Craufurd D.W. Goodwin, eds., The Margi-
nal Revolution: Interpretation and Evaluation (Duke, 1973); Symposium on the Marginalist
Revolution, 4 Hist. Pol. Econ. (1972).
76. See, for example, Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford,
1986).
77. For studies on Darwinism and Christian beliefs in the United States, see Charles Hodge,
What is Darwinism? (T. Nelson & Sons, 1874) (in which the author, a Presbyterian theologian,
attacks Darwin); Joseph LeConte, Evolution, Its Nature, Its Evidences, and Its Relation to Reli-
gious Thought (Appleton, 1897) (attempting to synthesize Darwin and liberal religion). See gener-
ally George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: the Shaping of Twentieth
Century Evangelicalism, 1870-1925 (Oxford, 1980).
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up in arms over marginalism, nor did they pass legislation against
teaching it in the schools. In this positivistic age being scientific meant
being able to escape from traditional Christian values, and choosing
Darwinism represented an explicit turn away from myth toward the sci-
entific in a way that marginalism did not. For historians in the Progres-
sive liberal tradition, who generally have dominated the historical
writing on the Progressive Era, the transformation of fundamental val-
ues wrought by the theory of evolution has always been too attractive to
avoid.
Nevertheless, the same drama that has attracted historians to Dar-
winism suggests that marginalism may have been a greater contributor
to the process of Progressive Era thought. The marginalist revolution
was more technical than was the Darwinian revolution. Indeed, much of
the Darwinian revolution in the social sciences was rhetorical rather
than methodological. Darwinism contributed in an important way to
one's metaphysical or moral understanding of the essential nature of
humanity and supplied a revisionist way of thinking about the relation-
ship between human beings and their environment. It did little, how-
ever, to help construct explicit models for explaining or predicting
human behavior or its consequences in particular settings. As a result,
Darwinism shows up much more in popular literature, which describes
what social science is like, than in technical literature, which represents
how social science is done.7 8 Once the questions become specific, Dar-
winian generalities give way to the greater precision facilitated by
marginalist models.
Today, it seems fair to say that, just as we are all evolutionists and
legal realists, so too we are all marginalists. In some areas, such as the
modern law and economics movement, marginalism has become an ex-
plicit part of legal doctrine, and one does not need to look very hard to
find evidence of it elsewhere. Nevertheless, marginalism has been
greatly underrated in the history of legal ideas.
B. The Nature of Neoclassical Legal Thought
The term "classical legal thought" refers to a conceptualization of
law and a body of legal rules that prevailed in America during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. At that time, its jurisprudential
foundations were attacked, first by Progressives and later by legal real-
78. See Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law at 99-101 (cited in note 13). See also
Robert C. Bannister, Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought
(Temple, 1979); Donald Bellomy, Social Darwinism Revisited, 1 Persp. Am. Hist. (n.s.) 1 (1984).
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ists. 9 The classical legal system relied mainly on common-law rules,
justified by their use in facilitating economic development. Regulatory
statutes were reserved for a few areas in which traditional markets were
thought to work poorly. Classical legal thought was both strenuously
individualistic and fiercely private, in the sense that it strove to reserve
the largest possible arena for private markets and individual decision
making unhampered by the state's coercive power. For that reason cer-
tain elements of classical legal thought, such as its constitutionalization
of liberty of contract in the late nineteenth century, have been identi-
fied by intellectual historians with Social Darwinism." A much stronger
argument, however, is that classical legal thought closely followed the
work of the classical political economists, who supplied the theoretical
economic rationalizations for the classical legal vision of the relation-
ship between the individual and the state.81
As a general matter, the term "neoclassical" has not been applied
to a particular era of American jurisprudence. By contrast, there is a
robust tradition of neoclassical economic thought. Indeed, the neoclassi-
cal period in Anglo-American economic thought, which has continued
roughly from 1870 through the present, has been, by at least some mea-
sures, longer than the classical period, which lasted from 1776 until
1870.
In the late nineteenth century Darwinism and marginalism were
two models of the relationship between humanity and the environment
that were sometimes complementary, but often conflicting. Legal think-
ers chose selectively among dominant cultural views. They managed to
accommodate both models, sometimes in combination, sometimes one
to the exclusion of the other. Eventually the expressly Darwinian ele-
ments in that legal framework began to be suppressed or submerged
under the rhetoric of marginalist economics, in which effects "at the
margin" became the focal point of policy analysis. This legal tradition,
which has culminated in the modern law and economics movement, is
best denominated "neoclassical."
C. Marginalism, Darwinism, and Liberty of Contract
Liberty of contract was one of the most pervasive ideas in nine-
teenth century Anglo-American jurisprudence. Far more than a theory
about contract law, liberty of contract was the raison d'etre of civil gov-
79. For a general study of classical legal thought, see Horwitz, Transformation of American
Law ch. 1 (cited in note 70). For a study of the relation between classical legal thought and classi-
cal political economy, see Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law.
80. See, for example, Commager, American Mind ht 373 (cited in note 27).
81. See Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law at 99-101.
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ernment according to Locke, Hume, Rousseau, and Blackstone and, in-
deed, for the very democratic ideal that government is a product of the
"consent" of the governed.82 The concept originated even before the
publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations in 1776.83 In his An-
cient Law the great nineteenth century legal historian Sir Henry Maine
identified the emergence of modern law with the movement of societies
away from "status" and toward "contract" as the basis for social order-
ing. Indeed, Maine found that the influence went in the direction oppo-
site from what one might normally suppose. Only after the legal
conception of contract arose, Maine argued, could classical political
economy come into existence-for economics needed an institution to
analyze. In short, lawyers, not economists, first discovered the market.84
The heyday of liberty of contract in American law was the substan-
tive due process era, stretching from the 1880s through the 1930s, when
American courts used the doctrine to expand the right of private bar-
gaining by limiting the power of the sovereign to interfere.85 This par-
ticular manifestation of liberty of contract often has been identified
with Darwinism, particularly with Social Darwinism. Indeed, Progres-
sive critics considered liberty of contract and Social Darwinism to be
two sides of the same coin. 6
But liberty of contract is not as much a biological or anthropologi-
cal doctrine as it was an economic one. Furthermore, its pedigree long
antedated the work of either Charles Darwin or Herbert Spencer, the
father of Social Darwinism. To be sure, Social Darwinism and liberty of
contract are similar: both stand for the proposition that people would
be better off if the state declined to interfere in the struggle for exis-
tence. The important similarities end there. Social Darwinism is based
on an essentially noncooperative philosophy, while the economic de-
fense of contract, whether classical or neoclassical, is based on
cooperation.
Under the model of natural selection, each person competes with
his neighbor for the same niche and the strongest prevails. If the con-
82. See P. S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 36-60 (Oxford, 1979).
83. Atiyah, Freedom of Contract at ch. 4.
84. Maine wrote:
It is certain that the science of Political Economy, the only department of moral inquiry
which has made any considerable progress in our day, would fail to correspond with the facts
of life if it were not true that Imperative Law had abandoned the largest part of the field
which it once occupied, and had left men to settle rules of conduct for themselves with a
liberty never allowed to them till recently.
Maine, Ancient Law at 296 (cited in note 74).
85. Useful terminal points are In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885) (first substantial state recogni-
tion); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (first
federal recognition); and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (effective repudiation).
86. See authorities cited in note 9.
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cept of "agreement" means anything, it means that two organisms
might cooperate for their mutual advantage, but if one later violates the
agreement, there is no state to call upon to enforce it. Marginalism, not
Darwinism, provides the basic framework for showing that contracting
behavior can be mutually advantageous for two bargaining parties in
the sense that it permits each to obtain more utility than he had previ-
ously. Social Darwinism simply fails to accommodate such a theory of
mutual cooperation. To be sure, Reform Darwinism, with its revitalized
view of social planning, values such cooperation highly, but liberty of
contract is hardly the doctrine of Reform Darwinism; indeed, in the
nineteenth century, it was the Reform Darwinists' foil for a relentless
criticism of legal orthodoxy."7
III. MARGINAL DETERRENCE AND LEGAL THEORY
A. Law and Social Control in Progressive Sociology
Progressive era social science was often expressly Darwinian. But it
was also marginalist, and one must take care to distinguish the two
models. For example, the Progressives' most important contribution to
sociology was the concept of "social control"-the notion that environ-
mental and cultural, rather than individual, factors impose an order on
society and that at least some of these factors can be manipulated. Ed-
ward A. Ross, the sociologist whose pioneering book on social control
was published in 1901,88 was also a close student of marginalist econom-
ics and marginal utility theory. 9 Social control, as he envisioned it, was
the use of social rules to change incentives at the margin. Having iden-
tified a set of outcomes as moral or just, society could then legislate
rewards and punishments to encourage generally selfish people to en-
gage in behavior that would produce those outcomes. Ross's man was
almost infinitely malleable given the proper set of incentives, be they
the church, the market, education, or the law. Ross's work both re-
flected and shaped the Progressive liberal belief that the improvement
of humanity could be a realistic result of direct intervention in the
human environment.
Like most Progressives, Ross did not believe in the Lamarckian
theory that characteristics acquired by an organism during its lifetime
could be inherited by its offspring. As a result, he distinguished social
control, which was an ongoing enterprise, from control by forced selec-
tive breeding. Only the latter eventually could produce a race that
87. See, for example, Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L. J. 454 (1909).
88. Edward A. Ross, Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order (Macmillan,
1922).
89. See Ross, American Social Science at 176-80 (cited in note 2).
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might at some future time have no need for social control. But Ross,
like Darwin, rejected the notion that acquired characteristics could be
inherited:
The only thing that can enable society to dispense with control is some sort of
favorable selection. The way to create a short-clawed feline is not to trim the claws
of successive generations of kittens, but to pick out the shortest-clawed cats and to
breed from them. Similarly it is only certain happy siftings that can shorten the
claws of man .... It is processes like these, affecting the relative birth-rates or
death-rates of the social and the anti-social classes, which solve the problem of
order in such a manner that it stays solved. Mere control, on the other hand, is,
like sustentation or defence, something that must go on in order that society may
live at all.... The equilibrium achieved is perpetually disturbed by changes in the
personnel of the group, and hence perpetually in need of being restored by the
conscious, intelligent efforts of society.90
Social control, then, was not a device for developing a better race;
it was a device for creating incentives or disincentives for the individ-
ual. This particular element of the social science revolution was
marginalist, not Darwinian, and it was this element that was most cen-
tral to the transformation in legal thinking that took place during the
Progressive Era. The chief purpose of legal rules was seen, not as pro-
ducing a better race, but as giving people a set of incentives to do what
society wanted them to do.
Although this view of the function of sociology put Ross at odds
with some important Progressive social thinkers of his day, it became
dominant later in the Progressive Era. Thanks to work by August Weis-
mann and others, 91 few people doubted that the Lamarckian evolution-
ary theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics was dead. As a
result, humanity could not be permanently improved by improving the
individual, but only by selecting those individuals who should be en-
couraged to produce offspring and those who should not be. This ex-
plains the great influence of eugenics in Progressive theory. The
consensus that emerged, however, was that work in selective breeding,
such as that done by Francis Galton, should be reserved for people on
society's outer boundaries-criminals and the mentally defective. The
rest of sociology should concentrate on the improvement of the individ-
ual. Sociologists such as Charles Horton Cooley described these two
strains of thinking as "biological sociology" and "psychological sociol-
90. Ross, Social Control at 60-61.
91. Weismann was among the first to show to the satisfaction of social scientists that charac-
teristics acquired during one's lifetime could not be passed on to one's offspring through genetic
means. See Degler, Decline and Revival of Darwinism at 22 (cited in note 37); Peter J. Bowler,
The Eclipse of Darwinism: Anti-Darwinian Evolution Theories in the Decades around 1900 at 60-
66 (Johns Hopkins, 1983).
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ogy. '"92 His racism notwithstanding, Ross's general theory of social con-
trol belonged in the latter category.93
Ross believed that the most specialized and effective engine of so-
cial control was the law.9 4 As such, law's only legitimate purpose was
deterrence.9 5 Furthermore, optimal deterrence had to be marginal: "A
scientific penology [would] graduate punishments primarily according
to the harmfulness of the offence to society, and secondarily, according
to the attractiveness of the offence to the criminal." 96 Punishment had
to be public and ceremonial in order to have the maximum general de-
terrent effect.9
Coupled with his strongly psychological theory of human social
control, however, Ross had a theory of cultural evolution that was based
on a kind of natural selection in which the "inheritance" of acquired
characteristics played an important part. Tools, works of art, opinions,
habits, and manners also are thrown into the cultural pot in numbers
far greater than society can accommodate. A few are found by members
of society to be attractive, and their makers are rewarded. Others are
forgotten or suppressed. In a chapter on the "Genesis of Ethical Ele-
ments," Ross described how "some of the ideas that are set afloat circu-
late readily, while others meet with difficulties in passing from man to
man, and, like bad pennies, are always being rejected."9 " This theory of
cultural, as opposed to biological, evolution contained both marginalist
and Darwinian elements. It was marginalist in the sense that it ex-
plained why people have an incentive to create good and useful tools
and ideas and a disincentive to create bad ones. It was Darwinian in
that it revealed a type of social progress based on natural selection. The
result was a sociological theory that merged the prevailing evolutionary
and marginalist theories, just as the theory of cultural anthropology was
beginning to do.99
92. Charles Horton Cooley, Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind 296 (Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1909).
93. Much of the debate over "psychological" versus "biological" sociology focused on the role
of economics in sociology, with the economists arguing that only the former kind of sociology was
legitimate. See Simmon Patten, The Failure of Biological Sociology, 4 Annals, Am. Acad. Pol. &
Soc. Sci. 919 (1894); Simmon Patten, The Relation of Economics to Sociology, 5 Annals, Am.
Acad.,Pol. & Soc. Sci. 577 (1895); Franklin H. Giddings, Utility, Economics and Sociology, 5 An-
nals, Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 398 (1894).
94. Ross, Social Control at 106 (cited in note 88).
95. Ross said that for "afflictive punishment the sole justification known to the social scien-
tist is its deterrent effect." Id. at 108.
96. Id. at 110 (emphasis omitted).
97. Id. at 112.
98. Id. at 345.
99. See, for example, Edward Burnett Tylor, Primitive Culture (1871); Ancient Society
(cited in note 74).
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B. Deterrence: Marginalist and Darwinian Alternatives
Beginning with Holmes in the 1870s, an outpouring of literature
advocated theories of civil and criminal liability that emphasized the
role of law in regulating future behavior rather than in punishing a pre-
vious wrong or compensating victims. This deterrence revolution in le-
gal theory has been closely identified with the American philosophy of
pragmatism and characterized as Darwinian,'0 0 but in most areas the
marginalist model supplies a much better fit.
First of all, the rise of deterrence-based theories of legal liability
requires recognition that the source of law is sovereign policy, not indi-
vidual will. The state decides what kind of conduct is inappropriate and
then gives people a set of incentives and disincentives to do what is
right and avoid what is wrong. This model is distinctly opposed to So-
cial Darwinism, which views the state's optimal role as one of noninter-
ference in private relationships.
Second, the kind of deterrence that most Progressive era legal the-
ory envisioned was behavioral rather than genetic, thereby making it
much more consistent with marginal utility theory than with Darwin-
ism. Although creatures responded to the environment within the Dar-
winian model, the consequences were changes in the likelihood of
survival and the production of offspring. Thus, for example, Darwinism
might pursue the criminal liability problem through sterilization.
To be sure, the Progressive Era's conception of legal deterrence in-
cluded significant elements of both Darwinian (genetic) and marginalist
(behavioralist) deterrence. The first part of the Progressive reform
agenda has proved to be a kind of embarrassment for liberals today.
Progressive policymakers became fairly deeply involved in making the
world a better place by sterilizing "defectives." Such policy contrasted
sharply with Ross's conception of "social control," which used the law
primarily to give individuals incentives to alter their own behavior.
The Progressive record on Darwinian forms of deterrence is volu-
minous. For example, in 1900 August Drahms, chaplain at the San
Quentin prison in California, published a popular study of the Ameri-
can criminal based on cranial and facial measurements he had con-
ducted on 2000 San Quentin inmates. 1' 0 Drahms distinguished between
the "instinctive criminal," who committed crimes no matter how
favorable his environment, and the "habitual criminal," who had
100. See, for example, Commager, American Mind at 97-98 (cited in note 27). See generally
Wiener, Founders of Pragmatism (cited in note 38).
101. August Drahms, The Criminal: His Personnel and Environment (Macmillan, 1900).
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learned to live by crime because of adverse circumstances. 10 2 Drahms
concluded that the principal causes of instinctive criminality were he-
reditary, but that habitual criminality resulted from environmental
causes. Drahms's principal recommendation for sanctions was that they
focus on reformation. He believed in prevention, but only in the Dar-
winian sense of changing the environment in such a way as to remove
that which tended to create the criminal type.103
More radical reformist agendas soon developed. In 1899 the vasec-
tomy was developed as a reliable sterilization procedure without the
debilitating effects of castration. Several states began programs of sys-
tematically sterilizing certain criminals, often with little legal process.
Between 1899 and 1907 Indiana alone sterilized 465 criminals, a high
proportion of those convicted of felonies in the state. Between 1907 and
1926 twenty-three states enacted sterilization laws. Not all of the laws
were limited to criminals; many provided for the sterilization of those
deemed mentally defective as well. For example, the Virginia statute
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell provided
for the sterilization of the inmates of any state institution upon a find-
ing that the subject was "afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity [or]
imbecility.' 04 The opinion, written by Justice Holmes, has often been
used to quiet myths about Holmes's populism and liberalism, for it con-
tained some quite illiberal language: "Three generations of imbeciles
are enough."' 05 But the truth lies in the other direction. Many of the
most activist reformers of the Progressive Era were also staunch sup-
porters of the eugenics movement and believed that compulsory sterili-
102. Id. at 144. For a list of other studies of the relationship between physical traits and
criminal behavior, see Jerome Michael and Mortimer J. Adler, Crime, Law and Social Science
(Harcourt, Brace, 1933). A very famous nineteenth century American study of heredity and crimi-
nality is Robert L. Dugdale, The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease, and Heredity
(Putnam's Sons, 1877). Dugdale's study concerns a New York family that included a particularly
high number of offenders. Dugdale identified the causes as a host of hereditary diseases and defor-
mities, coupled with some undesirable environmental influences. By 1910 the work was clearly
outdated, but the publisher reissued it with an introduction by sociologist Franklin H. Giddings to
show how the newer science had determined that the causes of crime were largely environmental
rather than hereditary. See Robert L. Dugdale, The Jukes (Putnam's Sons, 4th ed. 1910). For
other important studies conducted in America during this period on the relationship of heredity
and criminality, see Leonard Doncaster, Heredity in the Light of Recent Research 165-66 (Univer-
sity, 1910).
103. Thus, Drahns's deterrence agenda included such policies as prohibition and minimum
wage laws. In Drahms's own words: "Change the environment and you inaugurate the process that
will eventually render these conditions impossible and after-remedies unnecessary." Drahms, The
Criminal at 373. For discussion of other studies conducted in America during this period on the
relationship between heredity and criminality, see Doncaster, Heredity in Light of Recent Re-
search at 165-66.
104. 274 U.S. 200, 206 (1927) (construing Va. Code § 1095h (1924)).
105. 274 U.S. at 207.
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zation of defectives was an essential part of comprehensive state
planning. 10 6 Progressive liberals, such as Ross and probably even Jus-
tice Brandeis, generally supported sterilization laws.07 Nonetheless, the
practice of sterilization came under strong attack in the early 1900s and
began to subside in the 1920s. °8
This Darwinian rationale for state intervention was not directed at
changing the behavior of existing individuals at all. Programs such as
mandatory sterilization were designed to deter only in the sense that
they sought to reduce the amount of criminal activity in the next gener-
ation. Furthermore, such policies could be carried out without reference
to the behavior of the persons upon whom they were imposed. For ex-
ample, the literature of the day, including Drahms's book, 09 espoused
the belief that one could quite easily recognize the "criminal type"
solely on the basis of devices such as intelligence tests and cranial mea-
surements; one did not need to wait for the commission of a criminal
act. Carried to its extreme, this policy justified intervention before the
anticipated criminal acts even occurred. Indeed, statutes such as those
at issue in Buck v. Bell were designed to do precisely this."0
In sum, one must distinguish two quite separate regulatory agendas
of the Progressive movement: the use of sanctions to alter people's pre-
sent conduct and their use to limit certain people's capacity to
reproduce. Historical writing about Reform Darwinism often. lumps the
two together; however, they are very different, and the first one is not
Darwinian at all.
C. Deterrence, the External Standard and the Rational Actor:
Holmes
Voluminous historical writing confirms that Holmes was interested
in the work of the philosophical Pragmatists at Harvard in the 1870s.
To one degree or another, these influenced his legal thought."' Holmes
106. By contrast, Justice Butler, one of the most conservative members of the Court, dis-
sented without opinion. 274 U.S. at 208 (Butler dissenting).
107. See Degler, Decline and Revival of Darwinism at 47"-48 (cited in note 37).
108. See, for example, A Protest Against Laws Authorizing the Sterilization of Criminals
and Imbeciles, 5 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 514 (1915); Joel D. Hunter, The Sterilization of
Criminals, 5 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 499 (1915). For a critique written after the movement had
subsided, see Stanley Powell Davies and Frankwood E. Williams, Social Control of the Mentally
Deficient 94-120 (Thomas Y. Crowell, 1930). See also Hamilton Cravens, The Triumph of Evolu-
tion: American Scientists and the Heredity-Environment Controversy, 1900-1941 (Univ. of Penn.,
1978); Mark H. Hailer, Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought (Rutgers, 1963).
109. Drahms, The Criminal (cited in note 101).
110. 274 U.S. at 206. See Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer:
Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 833 (1986).
111. See, for example, Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 787
(1989); Max H. Fisch, Justice Holmes, the Prediction Theory of Law, and Pragmatism, in Ken-
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appears to have followed the Pragmatists in the same way that he read
other Darwinians. They molded his mindset, confirming both his cyni-
cism and his legal positivism. Beyond that, however, Pragmatism is not
explicit in Holmes's historical analysis of the development of legal rules,
his legal theory, or his judicial decisions.
Holmes also closely studied the English utilitarians, including Ben-
tham. '12 Although the underlying framework of Holmes's legal theory
was Pragmatic and Darwinian, its content was utilitarian and marginal-
ist and was concerned mainly with deterrence.1 13 Holmes's neoclassi-
cism is scattered throughout The Common Law, beginning with his
development of the external standard in the late nineteenth century.114
Indeed, just as the neoclassicists had taken the utilitarian writers and
merged them into classical economics, Holmes took the utilitarian writ-
ers and merged them into a modern theory of special deterrence as a
rationale for all legal rules. Holmes's thinking followed Bentham's writ-
ing on the "Proportion Between Punishments and Offences"'1 5 far more
than it followed any Darwinian theory of law.
The external standard became a staple of elite jurisprudence in the
first half of the twentieth century. It was the principal jurisprudential
force behind such monuments as Arthur L. Corbin's developing theory
of contracts ' 16 and the emergence of modern negligence theory,17 cul-
minating in Judge Hand's famous test for negligence in the Carroll
Towing case, which measured negligence in terms of the cost of taking
precautions. 18
The external standard began with the premise that a person's sub-
jective state of mind, or subjective intent, could never be measured, cer-
neth Laine Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesnel, eds., Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism: Essays
by Max Fisch 6 (Indiana Univ., 1986); Wiener, Founders of Pragmatism at 172-89 (cited in note
38); Robert Samuel Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory 20-34 (Cornell, 1982).
112. See, in particular, H.L. Pohlman, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes & Utilitarian Juris-
prudence (Harvard, 1984).
113. See,'for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, Lecture II (Little, Brown,
1881) (specifically rejecting Kantian objections to deterrence theory).
114. See id.; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. Rev. 652 (1873); Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Primitive Notions in Modern Law, No. I, 10 Am. L. Rev. 422 (1876); Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Primitive Notions in Modern Law, No. 11, 11 Am. L. Rev. 641 (1877).
115. See Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation at ch. XIV (cited in note 15).
116. See Arthur Linton Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 Yale L. J. 533 (1912); Ar-
thur Linton Corbin, Discharge of Contracts, 22 Yale L. J. 513 (1913). Others are discussed in
Horwitz, Transformation of American Law at 49-50 (cited in note 70). See also Grant Gilmore,
The Death of Contract (Ohio State, 1974).
117. Mainly in Holmes, 7 Am. L. Rev. 652; Holmes, The Common Law chs. 3 & 4 (cited in
note 113).
118. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). On the Hand




tainly not with sufficient precision to enable the law to apply its rules
for liability and penalty. Speaking of subjectivity in the context of
criminal law, Holmes said:
[I]f we take into account the general result which the criminal law is intended to
bring about, we shall see that the actual state of mind accompanying a criminal act
plays a different part from what is commonly supposed.
For the most part, the purpose of the criminal law is only to induce external
conformity to rule.
Considering this purely external purpose of the law together with the fact that it is
ready to sacrifice the individual so far as necessary in order to accomplish that
purpose, we can see more readily than before that the actual degree of personal
guilt involved in any particular transgression cannot be the only element, if it is an
element at all, in the liability incurred. So far from its being true, as is often as-
sumed, that the condition of a man's heart or conscience ought to be more consid-
ered in determining criminal than civil liability, it might almost be said that it is
the very opposite of truth.
[Wlhen we are dealing with that part of the law which aims more directly than any
other at establishing standards of conduct, we should expect there more than else-
where to find that the tests of liability are external, and independent of the degree
of evil in the particular person's motives or intentions. 1 9
In his theories of crimes and torts, Holmes based liability on fore-
sight and measured foresight by an objective standard: "common" ex-
perience, rather than the experience of any individual.12 0 Speaking of
intent in fraud cases, Holmes concluded that actual subjective intent
was irrelevant; what counted was the "external standard of what would
be fraudulent in the average prudent member of the community.' 12,
Unable to identify the alleged tortfeasor's state of mind, the tribunal
should look instead to manifested acts and consider whether they are
the acts of a reasonable and prudent person acting under the same or
similar circumstances. In contract law the external standard holds that
parties' intentions are unknowable except through their acts and that
the principal relevant act is the drafting of the contract. As a result, the
meaning of a written contract is its meaning to the general reader, or
perhaps a reader conversant in the technical language that specialized
contracting often employs.
119. Holmes, The Common Law at 49-50 (cited in note 113). See also William A. Lundquist,
Note, Oliver Wendell Holmes and External Standards of Criminal and Tort Liability: Applica-
tion of Theory on the Massachusetts Bench, 28 Buff. L. Rev. 607 (1979).
120. Holmes, The Common Law at 130-31.
121. Id. at 137. In criminal law Holmes found intent to be occasionally important, but only in
making sure that society deters precisely what it wishes to deter:
Although punishment must be confined to compelling external conformity to a rule of con-
duct, so far that it can always be avoided by avoiding or doing certain acts as required, with
whatever intent or for whatever motive, still the prohibited conduct may not be hurtful unless




Was the external standard Darwinian, marginalist, or both? In its
origin it was perhaps both, but its operational logic owed much more to
the marginalist model than the Darwinian. The opening premise that
one can never examine the internal workings of another's mind was a
staple of behavioralist social science at the turn of the century. For ex-
ample, it formed the basis of J. B. Watson's dispute with William
James over the use of introspection as a methodological device for ob-
serving mental states.122
,Holmes's external standard purported to look at the "average man"
and to consider how he would act in a particular situation. Holmes
wrote:
The standards of the law are standards of general application. The law takes no
account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education which
make the internal character of a given act so different in different men.... [W]hen
men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiari-
ties going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare. [So in deter-
mining blameworthiness,] [t]he law considers ... what would be blameworthy in
the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines
liability by that.123
The same was true of Holmes's objective theory of contract. The "very
office of construction" of contracts, Holmes wrote, "is to work out, from
what is expressly said and done, what would have been said with regard
to events not definitely before the minds of the parties, if those events
had been considered.' 12 4
Today it seems quite clear that Holmes's concept of the "average"
person requires either individual utility comparisons or some equivalent
measure. Otherwise the average person is nothing more than a hypo-
thetical construct. Holmes never discussed in detail who the average
person was, but he apparently thought that discovering him was like
discovering the person with the average height or weight-one simply
measured everyone and then took the mean. In this sense assigning the
standard of care of the average person was for Holmes very much a
positive rather than a normative activity. The fact that he was seeking
a "certain average of conduct," that applied to "temperament, intellect,
122. The most important literature includes John B. Watson, Behaviorism (People's Insti-
tute, 1924); John B. Watson, Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (J. B. Lippincott
Co., 1919); I.P. Pavlov, Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Psychological Activity of
the Cerebral Cortex (Oxford, 1927); Albert Paul Weiss, A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior
(R.G. Adams & Co., 1925); John Dewey, How We Think (D.C. Heath & Co., 1910); William Chan-
dler Bagley and Stephen Sheldon Colvin, Human Behavior (Macmillan, 1919); William McDou-
gall, Social Psychology (John W. Luce & Co., 13th ed. 1918); Max Fredrich Meyer, The
Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior (R.G. Badger, 1911).
123. Holmes, The Common Law at 108 (cited in note 113).
124. Id. at 303.
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and education" 1 5 did not seem to trouble him. In short, thinking like a
utilitarian, Holmes made the average person his lawmaker: whatever
the average person's standard was, that was the standard the judge
would apply.
Holmes rarely admitted something that seems quite obvious today:
his "average" person was no more than an artificial construct. In apply-
ing the external standard, the law selected its own substantive standard
of conduct and then gave people an incentive to adhere to it. The adop-
tion of an external standard was effectively the adoption of the stan-
dard of some social group, be it a jury, judges, or legislators.
Holmes's average man was Darwinian in its origin but marginalist
in its application. It was Darwinian because the average person was re-
constructed from the circumstances-that is, one inferred preferences
from the environment or situation in which the preferences were to be
exercised. Furthermore, one assumed that, because human beings were
the product of evolution by natural selection, their minds worked simi-
larly and, on a class basis, responded in similar ways to the same set of
incentives. In its operation, however, the standard was marginalist, for
it sought the "maximizing" course of action for someone in a particular
position-the one that minimized loss or risk and produced the greatest
net benefit.
The external standard and the hypothesis of the average man
turned even private law into a social control device. The relevant actors
could no longer judge the legality of their conduct by looking within;
they had to look to the publicly stated standard. It was not enough to
be properly motivated and subjectively attentive to the needs of others;
one had to make sure that he did not commit an act inconsistent with
the standard of care of a reasonable person as defined by some authori-
tative element of society.
The interpersonal incomparability of utilities made Holmes's aver-
age man impossible to find; he had to be created. As Bentham had ob-
served already in the eighteenth century, judges really cannot
determine the average of such qualities as temperament. 12 6 As a result,
Warren Seavey argued in 1927, the law never determines the standard
of the average person empirically when it measures something like neg-
ligence. Rather it constructs the average person as the person who takes
the amount of precaution that the legal policymaker believes to be ap-
125. Id. at 108.
126. See Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition at 215 (cited in note 76) (dis-
cussing and quoting unpublished Bentham manuscripts from University College, London).
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propriate. Thus, there is no "standardized man," but only an objective
test.1
2 7
Deterrence-based rules as Holmes conceived them effectively made
law into a social control device by settling on standards of behavior,
hypothesizing that the average person should conform to those stan-
dards, and then providing penalties for those actual individuals who
failed to do so-whether the particular individual receiving the penalty
was average or not. In criminal and tort law, the standards required
certain kinds of conduct or certain levels of care toward others. In con-
tract law the standards required such things as clarity of expression.
For example, Holmes's ambiguous discussion of Raffles v.
Wichelhaus12 8 makes sense when viewed as part of an argument for
marginal deterrence. The defendant agreed to buy cotton "to arrive ex
Peerless from Bombay." Two ships named Peerless, however, were
leaving from Bombay, one in October and the other in December, and
the buyer and seller were thinking of different ships. The court found
that the defendant was not bound. Holmes wrote:
It is commonly said that such a contract is void, because of mutual mistake as to
the subject-matter, and because therefore the parties did not consent to the same
thing. But this way of putting it seems to me misleading. The law has nothing to do
with the actual state of the parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by
externals, and judge parties by their conduct. If there had been but one "Peerless,"
and the defendant had said "Peerless" by mistake, meaning "Peri," he would have
been bound. The true ground of the decision was not that each party meant a dif-
ferent thing from the other, as is implied by the explanation which has been men-
tioned, but that each said a different thing. The plaintiff offered one thing, the
defendant expressed his assent another. 129
Exactly what did Holmes mean when he stated that the parties "said"
different things-given that there was only one statement, that it was
contained in the contract, and that it said "Peerless" without specifying
which one? He meant that the word "Peerless," had two different, pri-
vate meanings and that the parties had simply chosen the same word to
refer to these two different meanings. For example, the word "mad"
means both mentally ill and angry. If one, referring to the incident at
Harper's Ferry, said "John Brown was mad," one might mean that he
was deranged. Another, noting his anger about slavery, might say "John
Brown was mad" and be referring to his anger. Holmes would say not
merely that they "meant" different things, but that they "said" differ-
ent things.
127. "The standard man evaluates interests in accordance with the valuation placed upon
them by the community sentiment crystallized into law." Warren A. Seavey, Negli-
gence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10, 27 (1927).
128. 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864).
129. Holmes, The Common Law at 309 (cited in note 113).
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Unfortunately, the fact that they "said" different things is unclear,
for they used a word that had two meanings. Holmes's real point was
that although the law's goal is deterrence, it simply cannot deal with
people's internal meanings. It observes only the chosen words. The Raf-
fles decision was correct because it gave people an increased incentive
to be clear about what they meant. If a word had two possible meanings
in its context but the agreement was unclear about which meaning was
intended, then a court was likely to hold that the agreement "said" two
different things. In that case, the two parties did not agree to the same
thing, and there was no contract. The penalty thus served to give both
parties an equal incentive to make their meaning clear. At the time the
contract was negotiated, both presumably expected to benefit from the
contemplated sale. Ambiguities of language had to be attended to at
that time as well.130
By the time he wrote The Path of the Law in 1897,131 Holmes was
much clearer that the point of this objective, external standard of con-
tracting was marginal deterrence. The whole purpose of damages, he
noted, was to give people a new motive for not doing something. The
pragmatic element in Holmes's Path of the Law is its argument that
law is nothing more than a prediction of what courts will do.1 2 If
Holmes's legal philosophy were reduced to that observation alone, how-
ever, it would have been a philosophy without a content. A litigator
arguing a case is interested principally in predicting what courts will do.
Indeed, Holmes made clear that his prediction theory was designed
principally for two different circumstances. One was the positive "study
of this body of dogma" merely to determine its content. 3 3 The other
was the situation of the person who wanted to know what he could and
could not do.'
These observations added very little, however, to the more general
content of Holmes's legal message, which was to develop optimal princi-
ples for assessing the balance between conduct and state of mind, opti-
mal negligence and contract rules, and so on. Holmes was quite clear
about this distinction:
130. As Holmes continued:
A proper name, when used in business or in pleading, means one individual thing, and no
other, as every one knows, and therefore one to whom such a name is used must find out at
his peril what the object designated is.... [I]f a man uses a word to which he knows the other
party attaches, and understands him to attach, a certain meaning, he may be held to that
meaning, and not be allowed to give it any other.
Id. at 309-10.
131. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
132. Id. at 457-58.
133. Id. at 458.
134. Id. at 461.
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So much for the limits of the law. The next thing which I wish to consider is what
are the forces which determine its content and its growth.... Even if every deci-
sion required the sanction of an emperor with despotic power and a whimsical turn
of mind, we should be interested none the less, still with a view to prediction, in
discovering some order, some rational explanation .... 36
Then, after turning to content, Holmes made this powerful argument
for marginal deterrence, rather than Darwinian selection, as the goal of
criminal punishment:
Do we deal with criminals on proper principles? .... If the typical criminal is a
degenerate, bound to swindle or to murder by as deep seated an organic necessity
as that which makes the rattlesnake bite, it is idle to talk of deterring him by the
classical method of imprisonment. He must be got rid of; he cannot be improved, or
frightened out of his structural reaction. If, on the other hand, crime, like normal
human conduct, is mainly a matter of imitation, punishment fairly may be ex-
pected to help to keep it out of fashion. The study of criminals has been thought by
some well known men of science to sustain the former hypothesis.... But there is
weighty authority for the belief that, however this may be, "not the nature of the
crime, but the dangerousness of the criminal, constitutes the only reasonable legal
criterion to guide the inevitable social reaction against the criminal. '1 3 6
The same attitude guided Holmes's position in the great debate
over the existence and nature of objective causation, or proximate
cause, in tort law.'3 7 Holmes followed the lead of other American prag-
matic legal thinkers, such as Nicholas St. John Green, 38 in reducing the
entire debate to a question of foreseeability, with foreseeability mea-
sured by an objective test. Holmes wrote in The Common Law: "If the
intervening events are of such a kind that no foresight could have been
expected to look out for them, the defendant is not to blame for having
failed to do so.""' The American pragmatists, notably Charles Peirce
and William James, came to the same position.140 Once again, the law
defined the harm it wished to prevent as a matter of policy and then
gave people suitable incentives for taking precautions. Equating causa-
tion with foreseeability was simply a device for tying the prevailing
rhetoric of cause to the goal of marginal deterrence.
135. Id. at 464-65.
136. Id. at 470-71 (citation omitted).
137. On the debate, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Pragmatic Realism and Proximate Cause in
America, 3 J. Leg. Hist. 3 (1982). See also Horwitz, Transformation of American Law at 51-63
(cited in note 70).
138. Nicholas St. John Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 Am. L. Rev. 201 (1870). See
also Nicholas St. John Green, The Three Degrees of Negligence, 8 Am. L. Rev. 649 (1874).
139. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law at 92 (cited in note 113).
140. See, for example, Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
VI Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds. at 275, 28-66 (1931-1935); William James, Essays in
Radical Empiricism 155 et seq. (Longmans, Green, 1912).
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The case for Holmes's Social Darwinism rests on a few isolated
statements drawn from various parts of his life. 4 1 Most of the state-
ments are as consistent with a much more general cynicism about
human nature as with Social Darwinism in particular. What Holmes's
thought does represent, by contrast, is a rather thorough-going margi-
nal utilitarianism, which shows up as (1) his broad-based willingness to
replace morality-based legal rationales with deterrence-based ratio-
nales; (2) his stressing of negligence as the unifying principle of tort
law; and (3) his identification of legally sufficient causation with fore-
seeability, measuring the latter by an objective test.
Marginalism is also implicit in Holmes's fundamental conclusion
that the basis of criminal liability and civil liability is the same.142 Both
Holmes's theory of torts and his quest for a universal basis for liability
in The Common Law seem quite inconsistent with the Pragmatist's
stated revulsion for unifying theories. 43 Furthermore, when one views
the law from the classical perspective, criminal law deals with immoral-
ity and harms against the state; it is public law. By contrast, civil law is
purely private and concerns only harms to the individual. An individual
has only one utility curve, however, and both imprisonment and the
payment of damages supply disutility and thus a disincentive for engag-
ing in certain kinds of behavior. Consequently, Holmes identified "fore-
sight" as the "common denominator"' 44 that cut across all forms of
legal liability, both criminal and tortious:
The purpose of the law is to prevent or secure a man indemnity from harm at the
hands of his neighbors, so far as consistent with other considerations which have
been mentioned, and excepting, of course, such harm as it permits to be intention-
ally inflicted. When a man foresees that harm will result from his conduct, the
principle which exonerates him from accident no longer applies, and he is liable.
But... he is bound to foresee whatever a prudent and intelligent man would have
foreseen, and therefore he is liable for conduct from which such a man would have
foreseen that harm was liable to folow.1 45
Holmes was certainly Darwinian in the sense that he believed that
the theory of evolution by natural selection explained the development
of species. 46 He cannot ultimately be classified, however, as either a
141. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, Introduction, in Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law
xxvi (Little Brown, 1963) (Mark DeWolf Howe ed.).
142. Holmes, The Common Law at 49-51 (cited in note 113).
143. See, for example, William James, Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of
Thinking ch. 1 (Longmans Green, 1907).
144. Holmes, The Common Law at 146 (cited in note 113).
145. Id. at 146-47.
146. On this point, see Elliott, 13 J. Legal Stud. at 126-40 (cited in note 30); Vetter, 72 Calif.
L. Rev. at 363 (cited in note 30); Benjamin Kaplan, Encounters with 0. W. Holmes, Jr., 96 Harv.
L. Rev. 1828, 1840 (1983); Mark DeWolfe Howe, 2 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: the Proving
Years, 1870-1882 44-49 (Harvard, 1962).
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Social Darwinist or a Reform Darwinist.' 47 He simply was unwilling to
find in the theory of evolution such broad implications for state policy.
As for Social Darwinism, he wrote in his Lochner dissent that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not, as the majority apparently thought, enact
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.' 48 Clearly, Holmes was not a Reform
Darwinist; his entire life he expressed deep skepticism about statist at-
tempts to improve the human race by making the world over. 149 As is
well-known, the attempts by some Progressives to make Holmes into a
Reform Darwinist have simply not held up. 50
Holmes was simply a person who believed in biological evolution,
but who never translated this belief into a general theory of law or soci-
ety. Indeed, most of his theoretical writing on the law notably omitted
citation to evolutionist doctrine. 5' The few occasions when he made
reference to evolutionary theory in his legal writings were concerned en-
tirely with the descriptive question of how legal rules evolve, not with
the policy question of what evolution has to say about the nature of
legal policymaking. 52
The real importance of Holmes's jurisprudence was its implicit
marginalism-in this case, its recognition that human beings respond to
incentives by comparing marginal costs with marginal benefits. The ex-
ternal standard in contract and negligence law, for example, clearly was
not related to either a Social Darwinist or a Reform Darwinist view of
optimal policy. It simply rested on the premise that once objectively
147. Some writers have classified Holmes as a Social Darwinist. See, for example, Richard A.
Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 Ind. L. J. 1, 23 (1983); Richard A. Posner,
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263,
267 (1982); Joseph Frazier Wall, Social Darwinism and Constitutional Law with Special Refer-
ence to Lochner v. New York, 33 Annals Sci. 465, 475 (1976).
148. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes dissenting).
149. See, for example Oliver Wendell Holmes, Introduction, in John H. Wigmore and Albert
Kocourek, eds., Rational Basis of Legal Institutions xxxi (Macmillan, 1923).
The subjects dealt with in this book are so interesting that it is hard to refrain from
expressing one's own views upon at least some of them. But in one place or another I have
said what I think about the foundations, and I will go no farther than to repeat that most
even of the enlightened reformers that I hear or read seem to me not to have considered with
accuracy the means at our disposal and to become rhetorical just where I want figures. The
notion that we can secure an economic paradise by changes in property alone seems to me
twaddle.
Id.
150. See, for example, Catherine Drinker Bowen, Yankee from Olympus; Justice Holmes
and his Family (Little, Brown, 1944). For a similar view, see Benjamin J. Cardozo, Mr. Justice
Holmes, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 687 (1931). For the critiques, see Irving Bernstein, The Conservative
Mr. Justice Holmes, 23 New Eng. Q. 435 (1950); Saul Touster, In Search of Holmes From Within,
18 Vand. L. Rev. 437 (1965).
151. See Hovenkamp, 64 Tex. L. Rev. at 659-62 (cited in note 2).
152. See, for example, Holmes, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443 (cited in note 30).
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reasonable rules were stated, people would adjust their future behavior
so as to maximize their own positions.
IV. LEGAL POLICY AND PROBLEMS OF VALUE
The marginalist revolution also shaped American legal thinking
about the nature of value in the same way that neoclassicism revised
classicism's theory of value. The most immediate impact of marginalist
theory in the writings of economists such as Jevons and Marshall 153 was
not on marginal deterrence, but on the classical theory of value. That
impact eventually showed up in a wide variety of state policies.154 Here
I discuss two such influences, one rather briefly and one at greater
length.
A. The Decline of the Wage-Fund Doctrine
The wage-fund doctrine, 55 which dominated classical economic
and legal theory in the nineteenth century, held that at any given time
the total fund available for the payment of wages was directly related to
the amount of capital that had previously been invested in an enter-
prise. The doctrine was distinctly classical, or "premarginalist," in the
sense that it looked backward, at what had already been paid in, to
determine value. Under this theory maximum wages equaled the
amount of the fund divided by the number of workers. If wages were
too high, the fund would be depleted, producers would suffer declines in
output and perhaps be driven into bankruptcy, and unemployment and
starvation would result for laborers. Thus, the wage-fund theory pro-
vided a powerful argument against labor unions and legislative interfer-
ence with the labor market, such as minimum wage statutes.15 6 Judicial
opinions such as Adkins v. Children's Hospital,15 7 relied on the wage-
fund theory in striking down such legislative attempts to increase the
rate of wages.
The wage-fund theory originated from simple agrarian analogies,
contexts in which there was no labor contract at all. For example, a
farmer laboring in his field had to live on last year's corn, not the im-
153. See discussion in notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
154. For example, it also affected monetary policy, in which marginalism appeared to justify
the abandonment of bimetallism or the gold standard in favor of currencies based on the sover-
eign's creditworthiness.
155. For a detailed discussion of the wage-fund theory, its impact on legal policy, and its
displacement by the marginal value theory, see Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law ch. 16
(cited in note 13).
156. For a detailed analysis by an American contemporary critic, see Francis Walker, The
Wage-Fund Theory, 120 N. Am. Rev. 84 (1875).
157. 261 U.S. at 557.
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mature corn then growing in the field. If he relied on the latter, he
would eventually starve. William Graham Sumner, one of the
staunchest defenders of the wage-fund doctrine in the United States,
ridiculed its critics by analogizing their views to the belief "that a man
who was tilling the ground in June could eat the crop he expected to
have in September, or that a tailor could be wearing the coat which he
was making."15
The rise of marginalism in economics undermined classical theo-
ries, which predicated value on previous investment. In their place
arose theories emphasizing anticipated productivity. 15 9 When an entre-
preneur hired a laborer, the appropriate wage depended on the worker's
marginal contribution to the production process not the previous in-
vestment in capital. If a worker added value equal to fifteen cents per
hour, the employer would be willing to pay any amount up to fifteen
cents per hour less the costs of maintaining the worker. In short, the
determination of a laborer's value was a forward- rather than back-
ward-looking process, which emphasized productivity at the mar-
gin-the amount of additional value that the work would produce.
According to the marginal value theory, workers' wages produced a
surplus, and the purpose of public wage policy was to determine who
would get that surplus. If a worker, whose subsistence rate was ten
cents per hour, contributed fifteen cents per hour in productive value,
the five cent surplus would go to the employer, assuming wages were set
at the subsistence level. Forcing the employer to pay any amount up to
fifteen cents per hour was viewed as efficient because the worker would
still be earning his pay and no injury to productivity would occur. In
the eyes of Progressive economists, the only question was whether the
surplus should go to the rather well-off employer or the rather impover-
ished laborer. For economists who believed that utilities were interper-
sonally comparable, this was an easy question, and the answer justified
broad encouragement of labor unions and legislated minimum wage
laws.160
B. Corporate Valuation and the "Watered Stock" Controversies
The most memorable and influential work of Progressive era re-
formers was not their elaborate proposals for social reform but their
158. William Graham Sumner, Wages, in Collected Essays in Political and Social Science
36, 50 (1885).
159. Americans include Walker, 120 N. Am. Rev. at 84 (cited in note 156); Stuart Wood, A
New View of the Theory of Wages, 3 Q. J. Econ. 462 (1889); Richard T. Ely, Property and Con-
tract in Their Relations to the Distribution of Wealth 2-4 (Macmillan, 1914); Clark, The Possibil-
ity of a Scientific Law of Wages, 4 Pub. Am. Econ. Assn. 39 (cited in note 48).
160. See Hovenkamp, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 1009-13 (cited in note 8).
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"muckraking"-their detailed exposures of great abuses and scandals
by those with wealth and power.161 Chief targets of the muckrakers
were the emergent large business corporation and the magnates who
controlled them, including John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and
perhaps most of all, Cornelius Vanderbilt and Jay Gould of the rail-
roads. Perhaps no series of scandals engaged the reformist mind more
than those concerning corporate financial abuses. Ida Tarbell excoriated
John D. Rockefeller's financial dealings in her history of the Standard
Oil Company. 16 2 Charles Francis Adams made his career on a series of
articles in the North American Review exposing the great Erie Railroad
stock scandal of the 1860s. 6 3
A story that became exceedingly familiar during the Progressive
era was that of the Erie Railroad and its financial dealings. The Erie
Railroad was a large corporation that bilked small investors, both stock
purchasers and creditors, through financial fraud, largely through the
issuance of watered stock. Stock was said to be "watered" when the par
value stated on the face of a share certificate exceeded the amount of
capital that had actually been paid into the corporation. For example, if
a corporation issued 1000 shares of common stock at a stated par value
of $100 per share, the statement was in effect a guarantee by the corpo-
ration's managers that $100,000 of capital had been paid into the corpo-
ration. This stated amount was presumed to be the corporation's value
and represented an assurance to both stock purchasers and creditors
that the corporation in which they were investing had a certain value.
Under the classical theory if the stated par value multiplied by the
number of shares exceeded the amount of capital actually paid in, the
shareholders could later be held liable for the difference. 64
Law treatise writer William W. Cook, one of the greatest defenders
of the traditional conception of par value, explained the significance of
par value and watered stock this way:
A share of stock is supposed, in theory, to represent its par value in money or
money's worth, paid in or to be paid in to the corporation.... All stock which has
161. See Ekirch, Progressivism in America at 58-63 (cited in note 58); Louis Filler, The
Muckrakers: Crusaders for American Liberalism (Gateway, 1968).
162. See Ida M. Tarbell, History of the Standard Oil Company (McClure, Phillips, 1904).
163. See Charles Francis Adams, The Railroad System, 104 N. Am. Rev. 476 (1867); Charles
Francis Adams, Legislative Control over Railway Charters, 1 Am. L. Rev. 451 (1867); Charles
Francis Adams, The Erie Railroad Row, 3 Am. L. Rev. 41 (1868); Charles Francis Adams, Railroad
Inflation, 108 N. Am. Rev. 130 (1869); Charles Francis Adams, A Chapter of Erie, 109 N. Am. Rev.
30 (1870); Charles Francis Adams, Railway Problems in 1869, 110 N. Am. Rev. 116 (1870); Charles
Francis Adams, Railway Commissions, 2 J. Soc. Sci. 233-36 (1870); Charles Francis Adams, The
Government and the Railroad Corporations, 112 N. Am. Rev. 31 (1871). On Adams's career in
railroad regulation, see Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, ch. 1 (Harvard, 1984).




been issued as paid-up stock, but whose full par value has not been paid in to the
corporation in money or money's worth, is watered to the extent that the par value
exceeds the value actually paid in."6 5
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated this classical view of corpo-
rate valuation in 1889, the "meaning of the word 'value,' and the basis
on which the idea of value rests" is the representation made on the
stock certificate of that which has been contributed. The stock certifi-
cate "stands in the hands of the subscriber for so much as, and no more
than, the amount actually paid upon it."'1 66
The logical basis of the watered stock doctrine was the same as
that of the wage-fund theory: value must be measured by the amount of
previous investment. As Adams noted in one of his many rhetorical ex-
poses of the railroad scandals of the 1860s: "It is an elementary princi-
ple of political economy, that all wealth comes from the soil; neither
human industry nor human ingenuity can produce any addition to the
material possessions of mankind, except from the earth." As a result,
"[t]he sum total... of the wealth of any community and of the whole
world consists of all that which it has extorted from the earth, enriched
by any... value which may have been added to it.' '167
Beginning with this classical and backward-looking premise about
the nature of value, Adams attacked the increasingly popular railroad
practice of paying stock dividends, which increased the stated par value
of total outstanding shares without actually increasing the amount of
capital that had been invested in the company. 16 Through the stock
dividend, the stated capital of the company-the par value multiplied
by the now increased number of shares, increased as if by magic. Adams
then praised the recently enacted Illinois Constitution for its special
provision prohibiting railroads from issuing stock except for "money,
labor or property actually received.' 69
At the turn of the century, most states had either statutes or con-
stitutional provisions prohibiting the distribution of shares to share-
holders unless the full stated par value of each share had been paid into
the corporation. 17 0 As William Cook noted, the law of corporate limited
liability, which he staunchly defended, made the problem of stock-wa-
165. William W. Cook, A Treatise on Stock and Stockholders and General Corporation Law
§§ 21, 22 at 28-29 (Callaghan, 2d ed. 1889).
166. Appeal of Lehigh Ave. R.R. Co., 18 A. 498, 499-500 (Pa. 1889).
167. Adams, 108 N. Am. Rev. at 130-131 (cited in note 163).
168. Id. at 138-39.
169. IM. Const., Art. XI, § 13 (1870). See Adams, 112 N. Am. Rev. at 52 (cited in note 163).
170. See Seymour D. Thompson, IV Commentaries on the Law of Corporations § 3903 at
479-481 (Bobbs-Merrill, 2d ed. 1910).
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tering even more acute. 171 Because of limited liability, creditors could
not look to the personal assets of shareholders in the event that corpo-
rate debtors defaulted and had insufficient resources to pay their debts.
In defense of corporate limited liability, Cook noted that it had made
the modern securities market possible. Without it, "the public would
not dare to buy stocks, because they would be liable for corporate
debts."1' 72
Because of limited liability, creditors could turn only to the corpo-
ration in the event of default. They had to rely on the value of the
corporation itself, rather than that of its human shareholders, in deter-
mining creditworthiness. Further, the value of the corporation was seen
as nothing other than "the money actually paid for the stock."'1 73 Cook
strongly supported state "blue sky" laws, which prevented corporate
promoters from selling stock that represented no value except the blue
sky. The statutes required that a state agency approve stock issues
before they could be marketed. 74
No state corporation law considered stock to be watered merely be-
cause the capital originally paid in had subsequently become worth-
less. 7 5 The primary concern was the value of the property at the time it
had been paid in. Under the "trust fund" doctrine, originally developed
by Justice Story in Wood v. Dummer,'71 and recognized by the Supreme
Court in 1873,'177 the stated amount of capital constituted a fund upon
which creditors were entitled to rely. If the fund originally paid in was
smaller than stated, creditors could rely on the personal assets of share-
holders to make up the difference. 17 As a result, the trust-fund doc-
trine prevented minority stockholders and creditors from being duped
by watered stock into thinking that the total amount of paid-in capital
was much greater than it really was.
The trust fund doctrine was subject to one important exception,
which suggested an understanding that value and paid-in capital were
not precisely the same: creditors were entitled to make independent
judgments of corporate value and would be held to the consequences.
171. On the development of limited liability in American corporate law, see Hovenkamp,
Enterprise and American Law ch. 5 at 49-55 (cited in note 13).
172. William W. Cook, "Watered Stock"-Commissions-"Blue Sky Laws"-Stock Without
Par Value, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 583, 584 (1921). As a result of limited liability, "we find in some
American corporations over 100,000 stockholders-total strangers to each other, and scattered all
over the world." Id. at 584. Indeed, as Cook acknowledged, limited liability had permitted the
"vast aggregations of capital which have revolutionized modern industry." Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See James C. Bonbright, 2 The Valuation of Property 799 (McGraw-Hill, 1937).
176. 3 Mason 308, 311, 30 F. Cases 435 (1824).
177. Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610, 620 (1873).
178. See Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law at 49-55 (cited in note 13).
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Thus, for example, if a creditor knew that the capital had not been fully
paid in but loaned money anyway, he implicitly had valued the corpora-
tion by some means other than its actual paid-in capital. He then could
not then collect from the personal assets of shareholders in the event of
the corporation's insolvency. 179
Marginalist economics rendered the par-value, or paid-in capital,
theory of corporate valuation untenable for the same reasons that it
had upset the wage-fund theory. Value depended not on previous in-
vestment, but on marginal contribution. Thus, value was best measured
by the corporation's anticipated ability to earn profits.
Nonetheless, the resiliency of the classical theory of corporate valu-
ation was very strong, and it lasted much longer than the wage-fund
doctrine. One reason was that Progressives viewed the rise of no-par
stock with considerable suspicion, generally attributing it to legislative
capture by corporate entrepreneurs. Adolph Berle, Jr. and Gardiner
Means made this argument even as late as the 1930s. They regarded the
separation of value from paid-in capital as more evidence that the link
between ownership and control of the corporation was all but gone:
What is a share of stock "worth"? ... Curious as it may seem, the fact appears to
be that liquid property, at least under the corporate system, obtains a set of values
in exchange, represented by market prices, which are not immediately dependent
upon.., the underlying values of the properties themselves. Two forms of property
appear, one above the other, related but not the same. At the bottom is the physi-
cal property itself, still immobile .... Related to this is a set of tokens, passing
from hand to hand .... which attain an actual value in exchange or market price
only in part dependent upon the underlying property. Into it enter elements which
are not normally admitted to be elements in the value of the latter. The tokens
may, for instance, represent in their value an appraisal of the supposed ability of
the particular management interposed between the properties and the owners.180
Thus, under no-par stock the value of a corporation-previously acces-
sible to anyone who knew stated par and the number of shares of each
class outstanding-became a mystery known only to the managers. Mi-
nority shareholders acted largely in ignorance.
Even Progressive liberal economists who found the marginalist
revolution quite useful in other areas were skeptical about no-par stock.
A good example was Progressive railroad economist William Z. Ripley
of Harvard's economics department. Although Ripley was too much a
marginalist to believe that value ought to be based on historically in-
vested capital rather than on anticipated profitability, he nonetheless
179. See Coit v. Gold Amalgamating Co., 119 U.S. 343, 347 (1886).
180. Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property 285-86 (Macmillan, 1932).
[Vol. 46:305
MARGINALIST REVOLUTION
believed that the no-par share statutes would prove to be the breeding
ground of "fraud and deception." '181
Nineteenth century courts rejected out of hand the marginalist ar-
gument that the true value of a corporation was its earnings potential.
Under this marginalist argument a stock should not be considered
"watered" merely because the stated par value was less than the
amount paid in. Rather, the relevant measure should be the present
value of future earnings. As the Supreme Court concluded in 1892, how-
ever, it would not consider intangibles reflecting on the earning power
of the corporation in determining whether sufficient capital had been
paid in, for these were "too unsubstantial and shadowy" to provide an
estimate of value. The Court conceded that a business's goodwill may
be relevant as between the parties to a transaction. Nevertheless, in
cases involving corporate defaults and creditor allegations of watered
stock, goodwill provided no basis for determining value. 82 A 1905 New
Jersey court-one of the courts that was most solicitous of corporate
managers-concluded that corporate promoters were not entitled to de-
clare the value of paid-in property by estimating future corporate prof-
its.18 3 The court rejected the view that it was "competent and lawful to
make up the valuation of the visible property to be purchased for stock
issued, by adding.., a sum of money ascertained by the capitalization
of the annual profits expected to be realized from a favorable marketing
of the product."'8 4 Most nineteenth century courts enforced this rule
simply by asking juries whether the money and property paid into the
corporation had a value at the time it was paid in that equalled or ex-
ceeded the stated par value of the shares. 85 This rule, generally known
as the "true value" rule, ignored estimates of value made by the incor-
porators themselves, even if these had been made in good faith.8 '
Even as these courts were stating the orthodox view, others were
developing rationalizations that changed corporate valuation from a
classical to a neoclassical exercise. As early as 1886 the Supreme Court
had adopted a standard for the federal courts that deferred to the in-
corporators' good faith estimates of the value of their corporation. 87 If
the estimate was made in good faith, then the corporation would not
subsequently be found undercapitalized simply because the value of
181. William Z. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street 49 (Little, Brown, 1927).
182. Camden v. Stuart, 144 U.S. 104, 115 (1892).
183. See v. Heppenheimer, 61 A. 843 (N.J. Eq. 1905).
184. Id. at 848.
185. See Clinton Mining & Mineral Co. v. Jamison, 256 F. 577 (3d Cir. 1919).
186. See Van Cleve v. Berkey, 44 S.W. 743 (Mo. 1898); Clinton Mining, 256 F. at 582 (dis-
cussing and ultimately rejecting the true-value rule).
187. Coit, 119 U.S. at 347.
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paid-in property turned out to be inadequate to cover the corporation's
debts. This good faith test became relevant when paid-in capital in-
cluded real or personal property instead of, or in addition to, cash. The
inevitable consequence of the good faith rule was that the value of the
capital paid in began to reflect estimates of anticipated profitability, for
such estimates guided even good faith judgments about the value of
noncash property.
The nineteenth century conception of corporate value was dis-
tinctly classical, tied to the labor theory of property value. The classi-
cist measured value by what had been invested; valuation was a
backward-looking concept. Not having marginal utility as a theory of
value and needing to explain how value was distributed among diverse
goods, the classicists generally resorted to historical factors such as the
amount of labor that had been expended on property or the amount
that had been invested in it. Of course, the classicist would concede
that the best measure of value was an arms-length purchaser's willing-
ness to pay, but willingness to pay was itself a function of that which
had been invested. In sum, the traditional par value concept of corpo-
rate valuation was identical to the wage-fund theory as a mechanism for
placing value on labor.
Marginalism perceived a corporation's value as a function of its
ability to earn profits-that is, of the degree by which anticipated reve-
nues would exceed anticipated costs. 188 Indeed, as many neoclassicists
would point out, the .amount of previous investment often had very lit-
tle to do with value. Corporations that had invested little but found just
the right niche were worth many times more than paid-in capital.
Others that had expended giant sums on research that had produced
nothing might be worth only a tiny fraction. To be sure, the classicists
had known these facts for almost a century, but had been unable to
develop a theory of value that would account for them.
The marginalist revolution had several implications for corporate
law. First, the entire concept of par value, which measured par as a
function of previous investment, was of little worth in measuring the
value of a corporation. To be useful at all, the concept of par value had
to be based on the current value of the corporation's assets measured
by their value to the corporation itself-that is, their capacity to pro-
duce a profit or their exchange value in a sale. Thus, George Kennan
argued at some length that it was perfectly legitimate for the Chicago &
Alton Railroad to reorganize in 1899 and to increase greatly its capitali-
zation even though no additional capital had been paid in to the corpo-
188. One of the better statements of this position among financial economics is William
Lough, Business Finance ch. 8 at (Ronald, 1917).
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ration. The new value simply represented the railroad's increased
ability to earn a profit.189 Opponents writing in the economics journals
generally acknowledged that, in theory, anticipated ability to earn a
profit was a superior measure of value than historically invested capital;
they complained merely that while invested capital was easily measura-
ble, determining ability to earn a profit was a purely speculative
exercise.19o
In 1909 a group of corporate attorneys led by Francis Lynde Stet-
son convinced the New York Bar Association to back a proposal to
amend the state's corporation law to permit shares to be issued "with-
out the dollar mark"-that is, without a stated par value.191 In 1912
New York became the first state to pass a statute permitting corpora-
tions to issue shares having no, or merely nominal, par value. The stat-
ute required the company to state its working capital, but permitted
the company to state the value of this capital in terms of current mar-
ket value, which of course reflected the business prospects of the
firm.192 During the 1910s most states passed similar statutes. By 1927
nearly forty states had amended their corporation statutes to permit
no-par shares,19 3 and by 1947 every state except Nebraska and Ken-
tucky had done so.'9" As the new statutes developed, they generally per-
mitted the shareholders or directors to declare the capital of the
corporation, making changes periodically.' 5
In approving of the no-par statutes, Victor Morawetz, one of the
most distinguished corporation scholars in the United States, acknowl-
edged that a business corporation must have a capital that cannot be
impaired by the declaration of stock dividends. Nonetheless, Morawetz
wrote: "it is not necessary that the amount of capital should be fixed by
reference to the nominal or par amount of the shares issued by the cor-
poration, and it is not necessary that the shares should purport to re-
189. George Kennan, The Chicago & Alton Case: A Misunderstood Transaction 28-34
(Country Life, 1916).
190. See James C. Bonbright, No-Par Stock: Its Economics and Legal Aspects, 38 Q. J.
Econ. 440 (1924); James C. Bonbright, Earning Power as a Basis of Corporate Capitalization, 35
Q. J. Econ. 482 (1921).
191. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street at 46 (cited in note 181).
192. Act of April 15, 1912, ch. 351, 1912 Laws of New York §§ 19-23 (amending the stock
corporation law, in relation to corporations having shares of capital stock without nominal or par
value).
193. See Thompson, 6 Commentaries on the Law of Corporations § 3627 at 455-56 (cited in
note 170).
194. Carlos L. Israels, Problems of Par and No-Par Shares: A Reappraisal, 47 Colum. L.
Rev. 1279, 1279 (1947).
195. As Berle and Means noted in 1932, virtually all statutes by that time permitted the
Board of Directors to declare the capital. See Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation at 159
(cited in note 180).
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present specified sums of money contributed to the capital.""19
Morawetz noted the emergent view that in most cases the amount of
capital paid in bore little relationship to the value or creditworthiness
of the corporation:197 "In most cases, the capital, or a large part of the
capital, of a corporation is invested permanently in fixed plant or ma-
chinery which cannot again be converted into cash, and whose value, in
great measure, depends upon the profitableness of the company's
business."'""
A potential creditor or purchaser of shares probably was less inter-
ested in the amount of capital that had been paid into the business
than in the business's potential to earn a profit. By the late 1910s a few
courts began to hold that the proper measure of the value of property
was the going concern value of the property to the corporation rather
than its historical value. 19 9 As a consequence, the trust-fund doctrine
gradually disappeared.200 James Bonbright, one of the best-known
scholars of corporate finance from the 1930s, concluded that the emerg-
ing definition of corporate value was far more realistic than the classical
definition because creditors were much more interested in "going con-
cern" values.20 ' In his influential treatise on corporate finance, Arthur
Stone Dewing distinguished between economic, accounting, and legal
conceptions of corporate capital. Both the legal and the accounting con-
ceptions relied heavily on the stated values of amounts that had previ-
ously been paid in. By contrast, businessmen and investors were
interested mainly in the economic meaning of capital, which concerned
productive value. A corporation might have a patent for which it paid
little or nothing, noted Dewing, but which was nevertheless of great
value.20 2 Rather than basing a corporation's creditworthiness, or "capi-
tal," on what had been paid in, one should take account of "anything of
concrete and specific value, material or intangible, which afford[ed] def-
196. Victor Morawetz, Shares Without Nominal or Par Value, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 729, 729
(1913).
197. One exception was banks and similar corporations "whose business is to deal in money,
credits, and securities, and whose assets are kept in liquid form." Id.
198. Id.
199.. See, for example, Clinton Mining, 256 F. at 581-82, which permitted valuation to be
based even on the probability that a mining corporation would discover additional ore not yet
discovered on the date of the claim.
200. See Thompson, 5 Commentaries on the Law of Corporations § 3425 at 260 (cited in
note 170), who concluded that the trust-fund doctrine was "not only monstrous but in practicable
application would be ruinous to the business management of corporations."
201. Bonbright, 2 The Valuation of Property at 801 (cited in note 175) (stating that "[t]he
amount of 'invested capital' in which [a creditor] is supposedly interested is the amount of profit-
making power which the assets may confer upon the company").




inite help in enabling the corporation to conduct its business at a
profit. °20 3 Although he believed this conception of capital to be correct,
Dewing noted that it was easily subject to abuse because a corporation
could more easily exaggerate its earnings potential than it could the
cash value of specific cash or property that already had been paid in the
past.
In defending the rise of no-par shares, Dewing noted simply that
"the right to participate in earnings is the fundamental characteristic of
stock-not its right to participate in the property.... As a result,
no-par shares were designed to "record the proportional rights of their
holders in the earnings of the corporation and ignore the amount of the
contribution on which their rights were based."205 Under the classical
theory, par value was "the actual and substantial stake contributed by
the owners of the business, and on the strength of this stake [it was]
justified in asking for and receiving credit. ' 20 6 The problem with this
theory, however, was that paid-in capital had absolutely nothing to do
with the value or creditworthiness of the corporation as a going con-
cern. Dewing wrote:
[A]s soon as the new corporation begins business operations, whatever corre-
spondence between the value of its property and the nominal or money value of its
capital stock that may have existed in the beginning, is lost immediately. Some of
these operations result in a profit, in which case the corporate property is increased
while the amount of outstanding capital stock remains the same; some operations
result in a loss, and a discrepancy between the property and the par value of the
capital stock arises in the opposite direction. The important thing to observe is that
the equality between property and capital stock, however justified at the beginning,
is upset by the very operations for which the corporation was organized.20 7
Dewing was more sanguine than Progressive economists about the
potential for abuse. In his view no-par shares would increase the parti-
cipation of investors in corporate affairs. Having removed previously in-
vested capital as a basis for estimating value, the prospective share-
holder or lender would be forced to investigate the past and present
earnings of the corporation, the history of the corporation and its man-
agers, its standing in the industry, and the value of its shares with ref-
erence to current and future interest rates as they are affected by the
rise and fall of industrial activity. "These factors and others like them
determine values, and anything that forces the investor to seek for
203. Id. at 56.
204. Id. at 68.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 72.
207. Id. at 73-74.
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them tends to conserve the social capital by encouraging greater intelli-
gence and acumen among investors. 20 8
How to assess liability when corporations with no-par stock were
found to be undercapitalized was initially a difficult problem for the
courts, and they faced the new method of valuation with considerable
confusion. In Norton v. Lamb the Kansas Supreme Court simply held
that subscribers who had not actually paid even the one dollar nominal
par value stated on the share certificates could be held liable for that
sum.2°9 Other courts realized the worst fears of the Progressive critics.
They held that no-par shares effectively deprived creditors of a remedy
provided that the nominal par, if stated, had been paid and the corpo-
ration had met any minimum capitalization requirement assessed by
state law. For example, in G. Loewus & Co. v. Highland Queen Packing
Co., 210 the incorporators had transferred property worth $1500 to the
corporation but carried it on their books as capital worth $6000. Under
New Jersey law the requirements for issuance of no-par shares had
been met, and according to the statute such shares were "deemed fully
paid and non-assessable, and the holder of such shares [would] not be
liable to the corporation or its creditors in respect thereof."21' This re-
sult denied the creditors any remedy. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held
that the regime created by no-par statutes was essentially 'let the credi-
tor beware." '212
As Dodd and Baker pointed out in their widely used casebook on
corporate law, the issuance of no-par shares did not absolve the corpo-
ration of its obligation to state its value to potential creditors. Rather,
it shifted the focus away from the historical value of capital at the time
the shares had been issued to the current value that the corporation
stated in its accounting books. With regard to the problem of "water-
ing" of no-par shares, they wrote:
Even where the transaction or acquisition is one of mere barter of no-par shares for
property or services, a valuation of the latter is a practical necessity from the mere
fact that corporations are expressly or impliedly required to keep books of account,
and as yet there is no known way of keeping books in other than monetary terms.
So if Blackacre is acquired through the issue of no-par shares, it is necessary to
208. Id. at 75. Compare Richard H. Hollen and Richard S. Tuthill, Uses of Stock Having No
Par Value, 7 A.B.A. J. 579 (1921) (no-par stock forces the investor to look at the corporation's
current value before making an investment decision, rather than focusing on the amount histori-
cally paid in).
209. 62 P.2d 1311, 1314 (Kan. 1936).
210. 6 A.2d 545, 545 (N.J. Chanc. 1939).
211. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14:8-6 (1937).
212. Johnson v. Louisville Trust Co., 293 F. 857, 862 (6th Cir. 1923) (quoting William W.
Cook, Stock Without Par Value, 7 A.B.A. J. 534 (1921)).
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apply to Blackacre some figure in dollars at which to enter it on the books as a
debit to an asset account.
213
In 1947 Carlos Israels noted that a corporation could avoid all stock-
watering liability by simply stating its capital conservatively-no
greater than a price at which contributed property could readily be
sold-and then adding any additional evaluation as paid in surplus.
Such a company was not undercapitalized, and creditors could construe
the paid-in surplus figure as they wished. In all events, the value of the
shares was not driven by the amount that had been paid in:
The investing public has been "educated" to the point where it is now quite willing
to pay much more than par for a par value share, and where it is very little con-
cerned with book value, or with the proportion of the price of no-par shares pro-
posed to be credited to capital. Earnings or earnings possibilities appear to
dominate investor thinking as to price.214
By 1940 economists were taking a much more explicitly marginalist
look at the problem. For example, in the second edition of their book on
public control of corporations, Charles Tippets and Shaw Livermore
noted that the problem of watered stock had been attended by "much
loose thinking and writing.12 15 First of all, true value was virtually im-
possible to determine, and there were several methods of assessing it:
If physical appraisal by engineers is meant, then earnings rates could be matched
against a definite figure and a proper amount of securities obtained. But even slight
acquaintance with the conditions of competitive industry teaches us that there is
no typical relationship between value of physical assets and earning power. It may
be very different for a chewing gum concern and a steel plant.216
Tippetts and Livermore identified stock as watered simply when its de-
clared value "was larger than a reasonable capitalization rate applied to
the earnings" would warrant.217
Berle and Means had objected that the rise of no-par shares cre-
ated yet another opportunity for corporate abuse of outsiders. The
movement toward no-par shares gave directors the power to dilute at
will the value of outstanding shares.""s One problem with the marginal-
ist mechanism of establishing value was its imprecision and susceptibil-
ity to manipulation. By contrast, the classical theory had been
rigorously precise when the capital at issue was cash; it became more
speculative only when the contributions had been in property.
213. Edwin Merrick Dodd and Ralph H. Baker, Cases and Materials on Business Associa-
tions 1004 (Foundation, 1940).
214. Israels, 47 Colum. L. Rev. at 1292 (cited in note 194).
215. Charles S. Tippetts and Shaw Livermore, Business Organization and Public Control at
378 (D. Van Nostrand Co., 2d ed. 1941).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation at 159 (cited in note 180).
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The need for complete, ongoing disclosure to prospective share-
holders thus loomed much larger under the marginalist theory of value
because it looked to current capacity to earn a profit rather than histor-
ical investment. As late as the 1860s, stock certificates had been looked
at as almost a form of "currency," in which the par value stated on the
certificate was presumptive evidence of the value of the corporation. In-
deed, even in 1924, after no-par stock had become well-established,
Cornelius Wickersham complained that "gullible" purchasers continued
to believe that the stated par value on a stock certificate somehow rep-
resented the value of the shares. 219 Rather, a certificate stating "that
the holder is entitled to the share in the assets thereby represented
(whatever those assets may be) is a more accurate statement of his
rights as a stockholder of the corporation than one designating a par
value. 220
Thus, by the time the Securities Act was passed during the New
Deal, the perceived problem was not exaggeration of paid-in capital,
but rather "balance sheet inflation." Section eleven of the statute im-
posed liability on the directors for knowingly making false statements
concerning the value of virtually any element of corporate assets, and
gave a cause of action to anyone who purchased shares in reliance on
such statements.221
V. CONCLUSION
The most general and important implication of marginalism for le-
gal thought was its destruction of the concept that law could be either
private or self-executing. As originally conceived deterrence-based legal
theories may have rested on some conception of the person of average
sensibility, temperament, or carefulness. This conception quickly gave
way, however, to the notion that the average person was nothing more
than the state's reification of a standard that its decisionmakers wished
to impose. Ultimately, the standard was normative and objective.
Just as important, neoclassicism's forward-looking standards of
value greatly contributed to the uncertainty and open-endedness of le-
gal policy making. Contracts were no longer thought of as bargains
made in the past, but as the creation of ongoing relationships in need of
regulation. The transition to no-par corporate shares meant that corpo-
219. Cornelius W. Wickersham, The Progress of the Law on No Par Value Stock, 37 Harv.
L. Rev. 464, 464 (1924).
220. Id.
221. See In re Haddam Distillers Corp., 1 S.E.C. 37 (1934); In re Thomas Bond, Inc., 5
S.E.C. 60 (1939).
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rate creditworthiness could no longer be viewed as the result of a pre-
cisely measurable transaction completed in the past.
Looking forward necessarily implied greater uncertainty than look-
ing back, and uncertainty seemed to increase the opportunity for abuse
and error. These two factors-the realizations that standards were pub-
licly rather than privately created and that forward-looking policies
needed to be managed in ways that backward ones did not-account for
the rise of the regulatory state during the New Deal. That was the
greatest immediate legacy of the marginalist revolution in legal thought.

